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MICROFINANCE AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION:
LESSONS FROM INDONESIA'S VILLAGE BANKING
SYSTEM
Yoko Miyashita
Abstract: Indonesia needs an aggressive poverty reduction strategy to counter
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which has propelled millions of its citizens into poverty.
Microfinance is a proven method of reducing poverty and has been successfully used
within Indonesia in government-supported programs. In addition to continuing its state-
run microfinance programs, Indonesia should support increased non-governmental
organization ("NGO") participation in microfinance programs by permitting NGOs to
conduct the full range of activities of a state-run microfinance program. Such a move
would help to ensure that microfinance services reach people with the least access to the
formal financial sector.
I. INTRODUCTION
As Indonesia rebuilds an economy that was devastated by the 1997
Asian financial crisis, it will have to institute policies which are geared
towards reducing the growing number of those living at or near poverty
levels. In addition to the twenty-two million people living in poverty before
the crisis, the number of people living below the poverty line increased by
50% when Indonesia was unable to stabilize the value of its plummeting
currency.' Moreover, these numbers do not take into account the additional
millions who are currently hovering just above the poverty line.2 For
Indonesia to improve living conditions for the entire populace, any plans to
rebuild the economy must include "pro-poor" growth strategies.
Microfinance, the delivery of financial services to the poor, is a pro-
poor, cost-efficient, poverty reduction strategy. The world's poor lack
access to financial services, especially credit and savings facilities.'
Microfinance institutions ("MFIs") have been created to address this
shortage. Experiences over the last twenty years indicate that financial
services can be delivered to the poor at market rates, and without ongoing
' Anne Booth, The Impact of the Crisis on Poverty and Equity, 15 ASEAN ECON.BULLETIN 353,
356 (1998); The World Bank, The World Bank and Indonesia (visited Oct. 6, 2000)
<http://www.worldbank.org> [hereinafter The World Bank and Indonesia].
2 The World Bank and Indonesia, supra note 1.
3 JOANNA LEDGERWOOD, MICROFINANCE HANDBOOK: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL
PERSPECTIVE I (1999).
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donor or government subsidies.4 These services in turn generate income for
low-income clients.5
Indonesia should combat the recent increase in poverty by extending
microfinance services to areas where the poor still lack access to financial
services. Indonesia has successfully developed state run MFIs that are
financially viable and reach communities underserved by the commercial
financial sector.6  It has shown that a financial institution can deliver
financial services to poorer communities, not only cost-effectively, but also
profitably. Statistics have shown that Indonesia's successful microfinance
programs have, in fact, helped reduce the level of poverty among program
beneficiaries.7 Looking at the successful microfinance programs, it is clear
that these programs share a core set of operating principles and procedures.
By forming new MFIs that operate under similar principles and practices,
Indonesia can combat the recent increase in poverty by ensuring that most
underserved, poorer populations have access to financial services.
In addition to increasing the number of state-run MFIs, Indonesia
should encourage the development of NGO provided financial services.
While its government-developed programs have managed to bring financial
services to the traditionally underserved, the gradual increase in minimum
loan amounts indicates that these services may not be reaching the most
destitute.' Whereas a large state-run organization may have difficulty
identifying and reaching the most marginalized populations, smaller NGOs
would have the flexibility to target populations living in isolated
communities. To promote the development of financially viable NGO
MFIs, NGOs should incorporate the core principles and practices of
Indonesia's successful state-run MFIs, to the extent such principles do not
interfere with a NGO's need for flexibility in its operations. Bolstering
NGO involvement in microfinance services will require Indonesia to permit
NGOs to engage in all microfinance activities. Furthermore, Indonesia
should take steps to provide a framework for informally regulating such
NGO-run microfinance programs.
This Comment proposes that Indonesia should fight the growth of
Id. at 3-4.
SId. at3.
6 See infra Part II1.
See infra Part III.
9 R. Marisol Ravicz, The World Bank, Searching for Sustainable Microfinance: A Review of Five
Indonesian Initiatives 9 (1996) (visited Oct. 6, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/
Workpapers/WPS 1800series/wps1 878/wps I 878.pdf>. Whereas loan amounts for several microcredit
organizations in Indonesia ranged from $11 to $440, the Indonesian government's largest microfinance
organization (the Bank Rakyat Indonesia Unit Desa Program) had an average loan amount of $896. Id.
(All dollar values are in U.S. currency, unless otherwise specified.)
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poverty among its people by establishing more MFIs that operate based on
the core set of principles and practices derived from its successful MFIs.
Accordingly, Indonesia should promote the development of NGO MFIs by
providing a regulatory framework which permits NGOs to deliver all
financial services that the poor require, with the flexibility necessary to
service isolated, poorer communities. Part II describes the development of
microfinance as a poverty reduction strategy. Part III addresses the
development of microfinance in Indonesia. Part IV discusses Indonesia's
financial crisis and how microfinance can fit into a free market strategy for
broad-based economic reform. Part V discusses the policy changes
Indonesia can institute to help extend the reach of microfinance to more of
its poor citizens.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MICROFINANCE
In the past ten years, microfinance has gained recognition within the
development field as an economic and social empowerment mechanism and
effective tool to fight poverty. Microfinance refers to the provision of
financial services to low-income clients, including the self-employed.9
These services may include small loans, typically used for working capital
(also referred to as "microcredit"), secure savings products, insurance
products, and training programs for microentrepreneurs. °
Through the provision of credit, many poor people become self-
employed and, in turn, create employment opportunities for others.
Microcredit programs extend small loans to poor people for self-
employment projects that generate income, allowing them to care for
themselves and their families." In addition to generating income for
individual needs, microcredit loans help the self-employed expand their
businesses and create jobs for others. 2 There is a growing body of evidence
showing that access to credit helps poor people work their way out of
poverty. 3  Microcredit clients throughout the world have reported real
LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at I
I d. Microfinance is further characterized by collateral substitutes, streamlined loan disbursement
and monitoring, and the access to repeat and larger loans, based on repayment performance. Id. This
Comment will only address the microcredit and savings components of microfinance.
" The Microcredit Summit, Declaration and Plan of Action, Feb. 2-4, 1997 (visited Oct. 6, 2000)
<http://www.microcreditsummit.org/declaration.htm> [hereinafter Microcredit Summit Report].
2 Shahidur R. Khandker, Fighting Poverty with Microcredit: Experience in Bangladesh 1-2 (1998).
'3 Microcredit Summit Report, supra note 1I.
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A. The Unfulfilled Demand for Financial Services in Poorer
Communities
The lack of access to small amounts of capital is seen as a primary
reason why many of the world's poor remain socially and economically
immobile. The majority of people living in developing countries make a
living through small-scale self-employment. 5  Also known as
"microenterprises," these self-employment schemes are usually small,
family-owned businesses that are unregulated and part of the "informal
sector."'16  Approximately 500 million microentrepreneurs operate in the
world today. 7 Despite their economic activity, many microentrepreneurs
remain trapped in poverty. Lack of credit is cited as a primary reason for
their inability to pull themselves out of poverty.'8 Prosperous economies
depend on credit;' 9 yet for many microentrepreneurs, credit is not readily
available for working capital to pay for raw materials and inventory."
The risks and high transaction costs associated with lending to the
poor constitute a substantial barrier to formal financial institutions delivering
these services. In any financial contract, the lender requires adequate and
accurate information to assess the risk of lending to a borrower. To gain
confidence in borrowers, financial institutions usually perform credit checks
to ascertain each borrower's character, perform project appraisals to assess
each borrower's business prospects, and take a security interest in collateral
to secure loans.2  These practices, however, cannot be used in lending to
microenterprises.22 Most microentrepreneurs do not have a credit rating, nor
interviews with 380 FINCA village bank borrowers in El Salvador revealed that weekly income increases
averaged 145%. An Aspen Institute study of seven U.S. microfinance programs found that 62% of poor
participants increased their household incomes over a three-year period. Of these participants, 68%
increased their household income by more than 25%. Forty-two percent increased their incomes by more
than 75%. Id.
" Muhammad Yunus, Poverty Alleviation: Is Economics Any Help? Lessons from the Grameen
Bank Experience, 52 J. INT'L AFF. 47, 56 (Fall 1998).
16 Id.
" LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at I.
18 Yunus, supra note 15, at 52.
"9 Charles Caldwell & Patrick Meagher, Collateral Law and Economic Transitions, I ECON.
REFORM TODAY 301 (1996).
2' Elisabeth Rhyne & Maria Otero, Financial Services for Microenterprises: Principles &
Institutions, in THE NEW WORLD OF MICROENTERPRISE FINANCE 11-12 (Maria Otero & Elisabeth Rhyne
eds., 1994).
21 Id. at 13.
22 Id.
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do they maintain records necessary for performing project appraisals.23
Furthermore, poorer clients lack marketable collateral.24
The transaction costs incurred in lending to poor clients also deter
commercial banks from offering financial services to the poor. The
concentration of commercial banks in urban areas increases the transaction
costs of providing services to the poor, who often live in rural
communities.2" Furthermore, rural borrowers usually require individual
small-sized loans, whereas commercial banks generally lend to large,
established enterprises in modem industrial sectors.26 The relative cost of
extending such small loans to rural borrowers is much greater than the cost
of lending to large-scale commercial borrowers.2 Commercial lenders could
offer services to the poor but they would have to increase their interest rates
to reflect the fact that microfinance operations are more costly. However,
rather than doing so, bankers often cite image or bad publicity problems
associated with charging higher interest rates to poorer clients.28
The reluctance of formal financial institutions to extend credit to poor
clients also applies to deposit services. The absence of financial institutions
providing deposit facilities to poor clients is attributed to the mistaken
assumption that poor people cannot save because they do not have the funds
to save or because they choose to use their income for consumption needs.29
The assumption fails to reflect the widespread practices of poor people
saving cash, excess grain, and animals in the household.3 ° People save for
numerous purposes, including emergencies, investment, consumption, social
obligations, education of children, pilgrimages, sickness, disability, and
retirement.3' Research on rural financial savings, informal savings
mechanisms, in-kind savings as well as experience from savings banks,
2 Id.
24 Id.; see also JACOB YARON ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, RURAL FINANCE: ISSUES, DESIGN, AND
BEST PRACTICES 18 (1997).
2 YARON, supra note 24, at 18. Rural areas with low population densities are more difficult to
service with a centrally-located bank branch office. Id.
26 Id.; see also LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 12.
27 Because the cost of making a $100, $10,000, or $100,000 loan is virtually the same, poor people
with smaller credit needs are not perceived as a profitable market for credit. See Microcredit Summit
Report, supra note 11; see also YARON, supra note 24, at 18.
2" Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest, Commercial Banks in Microfinance:
New Actors in the Microfinance World, Focus Notes No. 12 (July 1998) (visited Oct. 8, 2000)
<http://www.cgap.org/html/pfocusnotes I 2.html>.
29 Marguerite S. Robinson, Savings Mobilization and Microenterprise Finance: The Indonesian
Experience, in THE NEW WORLD OF MICROENTERPRISE FINANCE, supra note 20, at 28.
11 Id. at 32-33.
31 Id.
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cooperatives and deposit-taking MFIs has helped shatter this old perception
that poor people cannot save.32
The dearth of formal deposit services in rural, poor communities can
be explained by financial institutions' misunderstanding of clients' needs
and clients' distrust of financial institutions. Operating on the mistaken
assumption that poor people do not save, financial institutions argue that if
poor populations do not save, there is no reason to develop institutions to
serve them.33 Traditional institutions are also reluctant to incur the relatively
high transaction costs attendant to handling the small deposits of low-
income clients. 34  Furthermore, low-income clients often lack the physical
access to financial institutions, which usually have limited branch office
networks.35 In addition, poorer clients often distrust formal financial
institutions.36
Despite the assumptions about poor clients and their inability to save,
those in the development field have come to recognize that low-income
households will deposit their surplus capital in financial institutions if the
institutions are appropriately structured and offer the clients savings
products that meet their specific needs.37 An appropriately structured
institution will take into account, among other things, the following factors:
An institution accepting deposits from poor clients must be
trustworthy;
3
32 Michael Fiebig et al., Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest, Savings in the Context of
Microfinance-State of Knowledge 5 (1999) (visited Oct. 8, 2000) <http://www.cgap.org/assets/images/
savings.pdrf.
"' Robinson, supra note 29, at 28.
34 LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 156.
35 Id.
36 A 1987 Bank Indonesia Jakarta study found that rural undersavings was attributable to the
"villagers' lack of trust in banks, their lack of education and consequent aversion to the use of financial
institutions, and their 'psychological inability' to make use of banks." Bank Indonesia Jakarta dengan
Pusat Penelitian Pembangunan Pedesaan dan Kawasan Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1987, quoted in
Robinson, supra note 29, at 3 1; see also SUSAN JOHNSON & BEN ROGALY, MICROFINANCE AND POVERTY
REDUCTION 20 (1997). When public confidence in financial institutions drops due to deteriorating political
or economic conditions, clients, poor and non-poor, often choose not to deposit their savings in formal
financial institutions. In Nigeria, when political difficulties resulted in a drop in public confidence in
formal banks, customers chose to deposit their savings with non-bank deposit collectors rather than banks.
The local people said they trusted the individual deposit collectors more than banks. JOHNSON & ROGALY,
supra, at 20-2 1.
" Fiebig et al., supra note 32, at 1; see also Eric R. Nelson, Development Alternatives, Inc.,
Financial Intermediation for the Poor Survey of the State of the Art, African Economic Policy Discussion
Paper No. 10 (July 1999) (visited Oct. 8, 2000) <http://eagerproject.com/discussionI 0.shtml>.
" Because the deposit-taking institution is making a promise to (re)pay the depositor at a later date,
trust is an important issue for poorer clients. Fraud or mismanagement of funds can lead to long-lasting
distrust towards the institution. Fiebig et al., supra note 32, at 4.
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" Poorer clients need a safe place to put their savings; a place that is
secure not only from physical risks such as theft, fire, or flood but also
from the demands of their families;39 -
" Women depositors need a place to put away small amounts in a safe
place, where their families or husbands cannot gain access;4"
* Poorer.clients prefer to save in liquid instruments.4
An institution that can accommodate such needs of poorer depositors will
find that poorer clients, in fact, do save and require the services of deposit-
taking institutions.42
Commercial banks and financial institutions do not fulfill (or in the
case of savings, do not recognize) poorer clients' needs for financial
services. The relatively high costs and low profits involved with lending to
poorer, rural clients deter commercial institutions from expanding the
financial services market to include the poor. Exclusion from the
commercial market does not mean, however, that the poor do not require
these services. When commercial financial institutions fail to meet the needs
of poorer clients, clients either go without financial services or seek
alternative sources of borrowing and deposit-taking services.43
B. Current Informal Financial Services Fail to Meet the Needs of the
Poor
Though informal financial services have developed to service
populations excluded by the formal financial sector, these services are often
inadequate and expensive. When poorer clients cannot obtain financial
services from commercial institutions, they often turn to informal financial
services for their borrowing or saving needs. Though informal financial
systems are more available to microenterprises than formal systems, they do
not offer the full range of services that formal institutions offer, and they
often charge very high interest rates." The inadequacy of informal financial
services in fulfilling the needs of poor clients coupled with the inflated costs
9 JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 22.
40 Id. at 19.
4' Fiebig et a., supra note 32, at 3-4. Liquidity, or unlimited ability to withdraw funds, is important
because households often save for emergencies and investment opportunities, which can arise at any time.
Robinson, supra note 29, at 35.
42 Fiebig et al., supra note 32, at 3-4.
4 See infra Part lI.B.
4 Rhyne & Otero, supra note 20, at 14.
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of services makes them a less than ideal source of financial services for poor
clients.
1. Informal Credit Services
Informal credit services come in many different forms.45
Microentrepreneurs often seek credit from local moneylenders, who often
charge exploitative interest rates.46 In addition to moneylenders, the poor
often turn to trade or dealer credit to fulfill their credit needs.47 Less
usurious sources of credit are also available through rotating savings and
credit associations ("RoSCAs").48
In general, informal financial services providers have advantages over
commercial financial institutions in delivering credit services to the poor.
Informal moneylenders or members of a RoSCA have access to superior
information about the borrower, lower overhead, and flexibility in delivering
services. Often in informal lending settings, the lender has communal ties to
the borrower as well as "insider knowledge" about the borrower.49
Furthermore, the number of moneylenders in each community may be
45 LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 104.
46 KHANDKER, supra note 12, at 2. For example, in Cochin, India, the Tamilians provide a money
lending service to poor slum dwellers on a daily basis. They have set terms, which are well known all over
Cochin. For each 100 rupees lent, three rupees are deducted as a fee at loan disbursement. Thereafter, the
borrower must repay twelve and a half rupees per week for ten weeks. This works out at an annual
percentage rate of 300%. JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 21. In Indonesia, informal moneylenders
typically charge interest from 2 to over 35% per month, often on a flat rate basis. Marguerite Robinson,
Harvard Institute for International Development, Rural Financial Intermediation: Lessons from Indonesia
Part One: The Bank Rakyat Indonesia: Rural Banking, 1970-71, DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSION PAPER No.
434 at 73 (Oct. 1992). Such high interest rates inhibit poor households from investing in productive
income-increasing activities. KHANDKER, supra note 12, at 2.
4' Examples of trade credit can be found in many markets, where microentrepreneurs obtain
fertilizer on credit from local shopkeepers, and at the close of market, return the money from sales and any
balance of unsold stock to the shopkeeper. The microentrepreneur retains a small proportion of the money
as earnings. JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 22. Dealer credit is common in agricultural areas,
where farmers sell their crop in advance to earn cash during the "hungry" season, when their main crop is
still in the ground. Called ijon in Indonesia, this type of arrangement results in the farmer selling his crop
in advance usually to a grain buyer or his agent at a lower-than-market price. The lower-than-market price
for the crop, when seen as a loan, translates into an interest rate from 10% to 40% a month. Id.
" In Rotating Savings and Credit Associations ("RoSCAs"), individuals form a self-selected group
and agree to contribute a fixed amount of money at regular intervals. Each member then receives the lump
sum on a rotating basis. JOHNSON & ROGALY supra note 36, at 17. Though members do not pay interest
directly, those who benefit from the loan early are privileged over the members who do not receive the
loan until the end of the rotation. The advantages of RoSCAs are limited by the inflexibility inherent in the
lending scheme; members are not always able to receive loans when they need them or in the amount
required. Furthermore, RoSCAs have the implied risk of some members dropping out before everyone has
had a chance to receive the money pool. LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 70.
41 JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 16. Moneylenders can also closely monitor their clients to
ensure repayment. KHANDKER, supra note 12, at 30.
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limited, in which case disciplined repayment is the only means for borrowers
to ensure that funds will be available for future loans." In the case of
RoSCAs, the flow of information within a community acts as a powerful
incentive for members to pay their installments, as failure to pay may invite
social ostracism from neighbors, friends or relatives."'
Informal moneylenders can also operate without incurring the
transaction costs that make it unprofitable for commercial lenders to serve
the poor. Moneylenders often live in the same community as the borrower,
eliminating the costs of having clients located far from an office branch. 2
Unlike the formal financial sector, collateral is usually not required for
loans; most are made based on a lender's familiarity with the borrower.53
Thus, there is also little paperwork involved in applying for a loan. 4
2. Informal Savings Services
As with informal credit sources, poorer clients can obtain informal
savings services, but they are expensive and limited in their scope of
available services. Informal savings services, including RoSCAs offer a safe
place to store one's money, but there is often no interest payable on the
amounts saved.5 In some situations, poorer clients must pay to deposit their
savings56 Unless appropriately structured financial services are made
available to poor clients, the poor will continue to face formidable barriers to
accessing credit essential for operating a successful enterprise and to
accessing a secure, interest-bearing repository for their savings.
C. The Development of Appropriately Structured Financial Institutions
for the Poor
As the need for suitable credit and saving services for low-income
clients has become apparent, MFIs have emerged to serve populations
excluded by formal financial services. MFIs can be NGOs, savings and loan
so JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 24.
I' d.
" Fiebig et al., supra note 32, at 6.
53 LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 70.
54 Id.
s Robinson, supra note 29, at 29.
56 In Nigeria, a peripatetic deposit-taker called the alajo goes door-to-door to collect deposits from
customers in outlying regions. Deposits are collected from each client every two days. The alajo collects
about ten to fifteen naira (about $0.50 to $0.75) at each visit, and charges the client one day's savings per
month. Translated into a percentage rate, clients pay 6.6% a month or 80% of one month's deposits each
year to deposit their money with an alajo. JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 21.
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cooperatives, credit unions, non-bank financial institutions, or even
government or commercial banks." Currently, over 900 MFIs serve an
estimated clientele of twenty million throughout the world.58 Many MFIs
are locally based, bringing services directly to the community. Their
development as quasi-financial institutions has enabled them to deliver
financial services without the rigidity of uniform service delivery prevalent
among formal financial institutions.59 Many MIs, in fact, have integrated
techniques of informal financial systems, such as use of "insider knowledge"
and peer group lending, into their financial services programs.6°
1. The Structure of Microfinance Programs
a. Identifying a target market
In delivering financial services, MFIs identify their target market in
order to achieve the goal of reaching unserved or underserved markets. 61 By
identifying clients based on characteristics such as their poverty level,
ethnicity, caste, religion, gender, geographic location, or type of business
activity, MFIs can pinpoint a target market they wish to service, and design a
credit delivery model appropriate for that target.62 To ensure that they serve
their target market, MFIs institute policies limiting their services to clients
with certain characteristics. For example, MFIs seeking to serve
"ultra-poor" clients as opposed to "poor" clients may limit their services to
clients who have a maximum level of income or assets.63
Many MFIs target women clients. Women represent the largest
5' LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 2.
The Microcredit Summit, Empowering Women with Microcredit: 2000 Microcredit Campaign
Summit Campaign Report (visited Oct. 8, 2000) <http://www.microcreditsummit.org/campaigns/
report00.html>.
59 JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 25.
60 Id.
61 LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 34. "Targeting" involves identifying a group of potential clients
who share certain characteristics, behave in similar ways, and are attracted to a specific combination of
products and services. Id. at 33.
62 Id. If a microfinance institution ("MFI") fails to articulate a target market, it can encounter
difficulties in managing its operations and can have difficulty staying focused. An organization that
provides financial services to the poor without defining who the poor are can end up operating with
different credit delivery models, trying to serve different groups and satisfy different donors. Id.
63 JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 36-37. Targeting may be implicit in the design of a loan
product. For example, if the target market is poorer clients, small loan amounts and additional
requirements like attending weekly meetings would make the loans less attractive to richer people. Id. at
37.
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proportion of the poorest segments of the world's population.' They earn
only 10% of the world's income and own less than 10% of the world's
property." In addition to the institutional biases against lending to the poor,
impoverished women also face gender discrimination in accessing financial
services." Commercial banks may be unwilling to lend to women or accept
deposits from them based on their perception that women do not have
control over household income.67 Cultural barriers that restrict women to the
home may also make it difficult for women to access financial services.68
By gearing their financial services towards women, many MFIs seek to
empower women by increasing their economic position in society.69
b. Microcredit delivery techniques designed for poor clients
Much of the public attention on MFIs focuses on their microcredit
lending services and the innovative lending policies attendant in delivering
those services. While each institution has differing lending policies,
microcredit lenders generally extend small, short-term loans to the poor who
lack physical collateral.70 Instead of using conventional collateral to secure
loans, MFIs use collateral substitutes, such as character references, group-
based joint liability schemes, and compulsory savings requirements. 7,
Character-based references can serve as an effective substitute for
physical collateral in microcredit lending schemes. Where character-based
references are used in the place of collateral, loan officers, often recruited
locally,72 visit various establishments in the community and ask about the
potential client's character and behavior.73 In addition to using character
Fiebig et al., supra note 32, at 5. Of the 1.3 billion absolute poor living in the world today, 900
million are women. Microcredit Summit Report, supra note 11.
65 Microcredit Summit Report, supra note 11.
6 Id.
67 LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 38.
68 Id. at 37.
69 Id.; see also JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 38. "Microfinance interventions may lead to
empowerment for women by increasing their incomes and their control over that income, .. and increasing
their participation in household decision-making. As a result, social attitudes and perceptions may change,
and women's status in the household and community may be enhanced."
'o Fawzi Hamad Al-Sultan, Microfinancefor Macro-results, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 22, 1997, available
in LEXIS, World News Database.
7' Id.; see also JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 7.
72 JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 7.
73 LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 137. In Indonesia's Badan Kredit Kecamatan ("BKK") program,
character references from village heads are used to establish an individual's loan eligibility. Jeffrey M.
Riedinger, Innovation in Rural Finance: Indonesia's Badan Kredit Kecamatan Program, 22 WORLD DEV.
301, 304 (1994). The BKK program's high repayment rates have been attributed to borrowers' reluctance
DECEMBER 2000
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
references as collateral, some MFIs use a borrower's character as leverage to
induce repayment. MFIs may threaten to announce, through public signs or
notices in the local newspapers, that a borrower has defaulted on a loan.74
The risk of being embarrassed in front of family, peers, and neighbors often
induces borrowers to repay their loans.75
Group-based lending schemes also act as security for repayment in
many microcredit programs. In group-based joint liability schemes, if an
individual member defaults on a loan, the group is ultimately responsible for
repaying the full amount of the loan.76 Individuals self-form into small
groups and receive one loan for the entire group. Members then decide
which individual will receive the loan. When the loan is repaid, the group
receives another loan and it distributes the funds to another member. Joint
liability of the group creates an environment of peer pressure that helps
achieve credit discipline without physical collateral.77
Some microcredit programs require security for their loans through
compulsory savings requirements. Where compulsory savings are used in
lieu of collateral, MFIs require borrowers to set aside a certain amount in
savings during the term of the loan. Part of the disbursed credit is withheld
and transferred to a deposit account in the MFI.78 Setting aside the funds
restricts borrowers from using those funds in their business activities.79 The
borrower is usually restricted from withdrawing the savings during the term
of the loan."0 The compulsory savings are made available when the loan has
been repaid."' The savings, then, can produce additional cash flow for
borrowers at the end of the loan term. 2 In addition to serving as collateral,
compulsory savings help clients to build assets.83 Furthermore, compulsory
to default and thereby damage their reputation with village leaders and other villagers. Riedinger, supra, at
306.
74 LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 137.
75 Id.
76 JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 7.
7 The Grameen Bank, in Bangladesh, is a pioneer in the field of group-based liability lending. In
the Grameen scheme, five men or five women from the same community organize themselves into a group.
Loans are made to two members at a time and the other members in the group do not begin receiving their
loans until the first two members begin repayment. Yunus, supra note 15, at 55. In addition to a
mandatory weekly group meeting, groups attend a weekly center meeting where all banking transactions
are conducted openly in the presence of Bank members. JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 7. Open
transactions at center meetings promote transparency, diminishing the risk of embezzlement and
corruption. KHANDKER, supra note 12, at 29.
7 Fiebig et al., supra note 32, at 14.
79 LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 138.
so Id.
81 Id.
82 id.
83 Id.
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savings funds can serve as a capital base for an MFI's other lending
activities.8 4
c. Interest rates in microcredit
Based on past experiences with subsidized credit, microcredit lenders
have learned that subsidized interest rates are not an effective means of
delivering credit to poor clients. Subsidized interest rate credit programs
have consistently been abused by rent-seekers and have not reached the
target group of the poor. 5 For example, development finance institutions
such as agricultural development banks have attempted to deliver cheap
credit to small farmers who do not have access to mainstream sources of
credit.86 The cheap credit, however, has often been captured by well-to-do
farmers who have used their influence to obtain the cheaper credit to the
exclusion of poorer farmers in need."
MFIs have also learned that they must charge interest rates at or above
market rates to be cost-efficient and to create sustainable microfinance
programs.8 Because the cost of delivering program services is high,89 an
MFI may often charge higher-than-market interest rates on their loan
products to effect full cost recovery. 90 In Indonesia, several microfinance
programs charge annual real interest rates of 50% or more.9' Despite the
high interest rates, the demand for loans remains high and clients diligently
repay their loans.92 This indicates that within a certain range, microfinance
" Fiebig et al., supra note 32, at 15. The Bank Rakyat Indonesia ("BRI"), a state-run MFI in
Indonesia, uses a variation of compulsory savings in its lending model, by requiring borrowers to pay
additional interest each month. If the loan payments are made in full, and on-time each month, the
additional interest is returned to the borrower at the end of the loan term. LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at
138.
85 Nelson, supra note 37.
86 JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 5.
"' YARON ET AL., supra note 24, at 3, 26. Diverted loans often went unpaid. In addition, during
election time, public funds were used to waive overdue and outstanding loans. Widespread default and
loan forgiveness resulted in the perception that subsidized credit was simply a government disbursement.
This ultimately led to a rapid depletion of loan funds. JOHNSON & ROGALY, supra note 36, at 5, 51. See
also YARON ET AL., supra note 24, at 3.
" YARON ET AL., supra note 24, at 26. The sustainability of microfinance programs is dependent on
the ability to break even given the cost of making a loan. To break even, the cost of making a loan (cost of
funds plus administrative and default costs) must be less than or equal to the price (interest rate) of the
loan. KHANDKER, supra note 12, at 84.
89 KHANDKER, supra note 12, at 29. The activities critical to maintaining high loan recovery rates,
for example, group formation and training, are expensive.
90 LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 18.
91 Ravicz, supra note 8, at vii. These rates, however, are considerably lower than the rates charged
by moneylenders. See supra Part ll.B. 1.
92 Id.
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clients are not interest rate sensitive.93 Clients value continued and reliable
access to credit and savings rather than lower interest rates.94 Higher interest
rates help to make a microfinance program self-sufficient, and greatly reduce
a program's dependence on government or donor subsidies.95
d. Financial sustainability of microfinance programs
In addition to the direct benefit that low-income clients derive from
microfinance services, microfinance programs are an attractive development
intervention because of their potential to become financially self-
sustaining.96 Unlike direct interventions like food or grain subsidies that
require a constant influx of funds, a microfinance program can become
financially self-sustaining by mobilizing enough savings and assessing
enough interest on loans to cover the costs of delivering services.9" A
financially self-sustaining MFI does not have to rely on government or
donor funds, which are not always available, to continue operating."
Furthermore, long-term viability of the institutions is critical to maintaining
client trust and high loan repayment rates.99 Experience has shown,
however, that total financial self-sustainability is difficult to achieve for
many MFIs.
Even the Grameen Bank, °00 one of the few organizations that has
almost achieved internal financial sustainability,"'0 has had difficulty
becoming subsidy free.' 2 In order to be a fully sustainable microfinance
93 LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 15.
94 Id.
" Dependence on government or donor subsidy without internal financial sustainability jeopardizes
an MFI's sustainability because government or donor funds are not always available. Riedinger, supra
note 73, at 303.
' LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 3.
97 KHANDKER, supra note 12, at 84.
9' Borrower perception of a credit program's permanency is important for the program's continued
success. Riedinger, supra note 73, at 307. Several programs use the availability of future loans as an
incentive to induce timely loan repayment. See infra Part III. If a program's long-term viability is in
question, clients lack the incentive of repaying on time in order to secure future loans.
9 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
'0 The Grameen Bank is a pioneer in the field of group-based liability lending. LEDGERWOOD, supra
note 3, at 2. Started by Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh in 1976, by 1991 915 branches of the Bank were
serving 1.1 million clients. Robinson, supra note 46, at 59.
"I The Bank first reported a profit in 1993. A microfinance program earns a profit when its average
on-lending rate is higher than the break-even interest rate. The break-even interest rate is the rate at which
the cost of operation (administrative, borrowing and default cost) equals interest income per dollar from
lending. KHANDKER, supra note 12, at 97-98.
"I Grameen's profit figures do not reveal the subsidies that support operations at the head office
level. From its inception, the Grameen Bank has received donor resources, such as grants or concessional
funds. Though it increasingly has turned to market sources for its funds, as of 1994, it still received
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program, it would have to operate with zero reliance on economic
subsidies. 10 3  Despite the difficulty of becoming self-sustaining, several
microfinance programs have attained self-sustainability over time."° The
successful programs include two govemment-sponsored microfinance
initiatives in Indonesia, the Badan Kredit Kecamatan ("BKK") and Bank
Rakyat Indonesia ("BRI").'0 5 These programs have aggressively mobilized
large amounts of savings from the public and have lent at rates high enough
to cover their costs of lending. These programs highlight the attractiveness
of self-sustaining microfinance interventions.
2. Assessing the Impact of Microfinance Programs
Microfinance's ability to help microentrepreneurs generate income
makes it an attractive intervention mechanism. 10 6 Research data support the
anecdotal evidence that microfinance can lead to poverty alleviation.0 " In a
1996 World Bank study0 8 of the socioeconomic effects of the Grameen
foreign and central bank loans and foreign grants. These loans were granted at a concessional rate, several
points below the market interest rate. No interest, furthermore, is charged on grants. The Bank also
received income subsidies, or donations, as well as an equity subsidy, which is the income from equity
held by program members, government, and commercial banks, subject only to market interest rates.
KHANDKER, supra note 12, at 102-03.
" Id. at 103. Khandker, however, projects that by raising its on-lending rate from 16.6% to 22.3%,
the Grameen Bank could become fully self-sufficient. Irrespective of whether self-sufficiency is the
desired end, Khandker points out that in 1994, the average cost of reaching a poor household in rural
Bangladesh with the financial services of a microfinance program was about Tk440 ($11) a year. He bases
this figure on the total subsidy provided to Grameen in 1994 divided by the number of borrowers during
that year. Given the Grameen Bank's success in pulling families out of poverty, he posits that an $11 per
person subsidy may be a small cost for the poverty alleviation results achieved. Id. at 103-04.
'04 Id. at 108.
"05 For a discussion of the BKK and BRI programs, see infra Part Ill.
'06 LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 3.
"0 Success stories from microfinance participants best illustrate the potential benefits of
microfinance services. Microcredit Summit Report, supra note 11. Nurjahan, a Grameen Bank client,
never earned more than $37.50 in a year before joining the Bank. Five years after joining the Bank, her
annual income had risen to $250; she also owned two goats, one pregnant cow, ten hens, and two-thirds of
an acre of land worth $1000. She employed two farm hands to assist with her rice crop. Furthermore, she
was able to keep her son in school. In a country where most children never reach the fifth grade,
Nurjahan's son was in the'eighth grade. Id. Romeo and his wife operated an upholstery workshop on the
dirt shoulder of the road to Iloilo airport on the Philippine island of Panay. They had no money for
supplies and had to ask for credit from their buyers to fill orders. They barely made enough money to feed
their family. The course of business changed when they received a loan of P6,000 ($225) from a local
Christian development organization. They used the cash for supplies and more workers; business grew
quickly. Romeo and his wife have since borrowed and repaid three subsequent loans. They have sent heir
two eldest children to college and are currently building a new home. Chris Prystay, Small Loans and
Hard Work Spark Entrepreneurial Spirit, ASIAN BUS., Dec. 1996, available in LEXIS Worldnews
Database.
0 The study was conducted by Shahidur Khandker. For a discussion of the results, see KHANDKER,
supra note 12.
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Bank's activities, results indicated that microfinance services led to
increased per capita expenditures, increased borrower net worth, increased
schooling for children, and positive nutritional gains for children." 9 Studies
of the BRI report similar successes. BRI borrowers enjoyed 25% growth in
real profits, 21% growth in household income and 18% growth in
employment per enterprise. "°
3. The Growing Popularity of Microfinance as a Poverty Alleviation
Mechanism
The growing number of well-documented success stories, like the
Grameen Bank and BRI, has led to a widespread adoption of microfinance
as a viable poverty reduction intervention.'11 In a time when rich countries
have cut foreign development assistance, microfinance is seen as a cost-
effective way of fighting poverty." 2  Microfinance's popularity is best
evidenced by the Microcredit Summit that was convened in Washington,
D.C. in 1997.1" Attendees of the Summit committed to expand the reach of
microfinance to 100 million of the world's poorest families by the year
2005."' The estimated cost of reaching this goal is close to $22 billion." 5
The United Nations ("UN") and the world's major development
agencies also support microfinance as an effective poverty reduction
strategy. In 1997, the UN passed a declaration highlighting the effectiveness
of microcredit in poverty reduction.1 6 The resolution calls upon UN
,' Id. at 46-49. "Poverty reduction estimates based on consumption impacts of credit indicate that
5% of program participants can lift their families out of poverty each year by participating in and
borrowing from microfinance programs." Id. at 148.
0 Stephanie Charitonenko et al., Sustainable Banking with the Poor, Case Studies in Microfinance:
Indonesia: Bank Rakyat Indonesia Unit Desa 1970-1996 (June 1998) (visited Oct. 8, 2000) <http://www-
esd.worldbank.org/html/esd/agr/sbp/98abst./brifin.httn>.
.. LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 4.
.2 Microlending: From Sandals to Suits, ECONOMIST, Feb. I, 1997, at 75. The Organization for Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") reported that official development assistance from OECD members
to developing countries and multilateral development agencies fell from 1992 to 1997. Aid fell from
0.33% of their combined GNP to 0.22%. Aid did increase in 1998 to 0.23% of their combined GNP, but
much of this is attributed to the surge in loans going to countries affected by the Asian financial crisis.
Financial Flows to Developing Countries in 1998: Rise in Aid; Sharp Fall in Private Flows, OECD NEWS
RELEASE (June 10, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/media/release/nw99-60a.htm>.
113 Paige Bowers, The First Lady Endorses Microcredit Efforts: Small Loans Found to Have Big
Results, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3662828.
"4 Microcredit Summit Report, supra note II.
11 Id.
16 G.A. Res. 52/194, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 97(0, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/194 (1998).
The resolution noted that microcredit has: succeeded in generating productive self-employment; increased
the participation of poor people in the mainstream economic and political process of society; empowered
women; and contributed to the social and human development process. Id.
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organizations to explore including the microcredit approach in their
programs as a tool to eradicate poverty."' In line with the UN's resolution,
international development organizations, including the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank, now highlight microfinance as a key component
in their poverty eradication strategies. "
8
III. MICROFINANCE IN INDONESIA
East Asian and Pacific Rim countries have been particularly
successful in effectuating microfinance as a poverty reduction strategy. An
inventory of twenty-eight MFIs in East Asia and the Pacific Rim, conducted
by the Sustainable Banking with the Poor Group ("SBP"),119 indicates that as
of 1996, over 66% of outstanding microcredit loans in the world were
serviced by MFIs in the region.1 20 The MFIs have also been successful in
mobilizing savings." Their success in mobilizing local savings has reduced
their dependence on subsidies from donors, as compared to MFIs in other
regions. 2
The numbers in SBP's inventory of East Asian and Pacific Rim MFIs
reflect the activities of the BRI, one of the largest microfinance institutions
in the world. According to the inventory, the BRI's Unit Desa ("BRI-UD"),
or village unit, program has mobilized $2.51 billion of total savings deposits
in the region, and together with four other commercial banks, holds 99% of
the value of microcredit loans in the East Asian portfolio.123 The BRI-UD is
one of several state-developed initiatives designed to address the problem of
limited access to credit for small-scale entrepreneurs in Indonesia. In
addition to the BRI-UD, several other government-sponsored microfinance
I1 d. at 6.
W18 orld Bank, Financial Sector: Rural & Microfinance/SMEs (visited Oct. 6, 2000)
<http://wwwl.worldbank.org/finance/html/microfinance.html>; see also Asian Development Bank,
Fighting Poverty in Asia and the Pacific: The Poverty Reduction Strategy of the Asian Development Bank
1 (1999) (visited Oct. 8, 2000) <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/PovertyReduction/Poverty_
Policy.pdft.
"9 "SBP is a collaborative effort of the World Bank, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway,
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and the Ford Foundation." Sustainable Banking With
the Poor-A World Bank Project (visited Oct. 6, 2000) <http://www-esd.worldbank.org/sbp>. Its stated
purpose is to help "improve the ability of donors, governments, and practitioners to build sustainable
financial institutions that effectively reach the poor." Id.
20 Sustainable Banking With the Poor, An Inventory of Microfinance Institutions in East Asia and
the Pacific, at IV (visited Oct. 6, 2000) <http://www-esd.worldbank.org/sbp>. MFIs in the region had 9.3
million outstanding loans with a loan portfolio value of $4.1 billion. The average loan size was $440 or
53% of the GNP per capita. Id.
m Id. at V. Some of the MFIs have compulsory savings requirements. Id.
1 Id. at VII.
' Id. at IV-V.
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programs, such as the BKK in the Central Java and South Kalimantan
Provinces, and Badan Kredit Desa ("BKD") in individual villages, help to
create a country with a rich microfinance environment. Many of these
programs operate locally,' 24 building on Indonesia's long history of village
level financial institutions.'25 Since 1898, Indonesia has had village level
financial institutions that have provided small loans to microenterprises.
These institutions have served as working examples for many of the
Indonesian microfinance programs in operation today.'26
A. The BRI-UD Program
Established in 1970 as part of the state-owned BRI, 127 the BRI-UD
program is one of few programs that has mobilized enough savings and lent
at high enough interest rates to become a financially viable microfinance
intermediary.'28  The Unit Desa ("UD") program was formed originally to
administer the Bimbingan Massal ("BIMAS"), or mass guidance,
agricultural credit program. 129 Under the program, 3600 new bank branches
were established on Java, Bali and the outer islands. 30 The bank's role was
to channel credit directly to participating farmers.'3 ' The BIMAS program
124 Ravicz, supra note 8, at vii-viii.
"' Charitonenko et al., supra note 110. Many of Indonesia's microfinance programs are locally
based. To understand the structure and outreach of these programs, it is helpful to have a general
understanding of the political subdivisions below the central government:
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
PROPINSI (PROVINCE)
KABUPATEN/KOTAMADYA (DISTRICT)
KECAMATAN (SUB-DISTRICT)
DESA (VILLAGE)
Adapted from Charitonenko et al., supra note 110.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 KHANDKER. supra note 12, at 15. See also Paul B. McGuire et al., Getting the Framework Right:
Policy and Regulation for Microfinance in Asia, § 2.1 (1998) (visited Oct. 6, 2000)
<www.bwtp.org/publications/pub/Appendix3.htm>. The BRI has 300 branch offices in provincial and
district centers and operates 3,600 village banking units. At the end of 1996, 2.5 million loans were
outstanding from Unit Desa ("UD"), with a total value of $1.7 billion. These banking units also held close
to sixteen million savings accounts totaling $2.6 billion. See McGuire, supra, § 2.1.
29 Charitonenko et al., supra note 110.
, James Boomgard & Kenneth Angell, Bank Rakyat Indonesia 's Unit Desa System: Achievements
and Replicability, in THE NEW WORLD OF MICROENTERPRISE FINANCE, supra note 20, at 207. Most of the
banks were located in kecamatan (subdistrict) capital towns and served an average of eighteen villages. Id.
See also Robinson, supra note 46, at 21.
"' Boomgard & Angell, supra note 130, at 21.
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peaked in the mid-1970s, declining rapidly thereafter as wealthier farmers
captured the cheap credit, and in turn, defaulted on the loans.'32
In 1984, the BRI-UD program faced growing losses; the UD were no
longer receiving subsidies for the BIMAS program and the government's
budget was diminishing rapidly.'33 Dismantling the UD would have
eliminated banking in approximately 90% of the country.'34 It would have
also displaced the 14,000 trained UD employees.' Rather than dismantling
the infrastructure developed in creating the UD, the Indonesian government
sought to transform the UD into financially viable microfinance
intermediaries. The goal was to discontinue subsidies to the UD within two
years.' 36  Offering one loan product, Kredit Umum Pedesaan
3 7
("KUPEDES"), and one national savings instrument called TABANAS,'
the UD program achieved financial sustainability within the two-year
subsidy cushion. Without the unexpected costs that arise from creating a
new organization, the UD were able to assess their operating costs and
accurately price the KUPEDES product and the TABANAS accounts.
39
Within two years of the BIMAS program's termination, the UD had been
transformed into profitable microfinance intermediaries. 4 °
The UD operate as a profit center within the larger BRI.'4 ' The BRI-
UD are subject to "clear and transparent" reporting requirements and are
132 Id. at 207-08; see also Riedinger, supra note 73, at 303. There were no penalties for delinquent
payments and the program often forgave past-due loans. Riedinger, supra note 73, at 303. In addition, a
series of rice crop failures from the mid-1970's to mid-1980's had a major negative effect on the results of
the agricultural credit program. Robinson, supra note 46, at 23.
"' Dropping international oil prices eroded Indonesia's oil revenues, which financed more than 60%
of the government's budget. Boomgard & Angell, supra note 130, at 208-09.
134 Robinson, supra note 46, at 16.
'3 Boomgard & Angell, supra note 130, at 209.
135 Charitonenko et al., supra note 110.
Kredit Umum Pedesaan ("KUPEDES") loans were extended to men and women for any
productive enterprise. Id.
13' TABANAS is a nationally sponsored savings program by the Bank of Indonesia that has been in
operation since 1976. Id. It pays 1.25 % monthly interest and restricts withdrawals to two per month. Id.
"' The program assumed that its loan funds would come from savings deposits in the TABANAS
accounts, carrying a cost of funds of 15%. Id. Accounting for inflation, the nominal interest for a
KUPEDES loan was set at 32%. The spread in interest between KUPEDES and TABANAS was sufficient
to cover all operating costs. Id.
140 Id.
... LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 16. Each UD has a minimum staff of four consisting of a general
manager, a loan officer, a bookkeeper, and a cashier. When the number of staff grows to eleven, a UD is
split into two separate units. UDs may establish service posts, manned by a bookkeeper and a cashier, to
service the needs of clients in outlying areas. The service posts collect savings and loan payments and loan
applications, but do not make loans. Boomgard & Angell, supra note 130, at 210.
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accountable to a larger BRI branch office.142 Funds available to the UD
program are provided from several sources, including grants and savings
mobilization. Grants are the only direct subsidies that UD receive, and they
are limited to a BRI grant disbursed when a UD is formed. 143  The most
important source of funds for the UD is mobilized savings. The UD
program has been self-funding since 1989, when the total amount in deposits
surpassed total amounts loaned.' 44 The UD place their excess savings in BRI
branch offices where they earn an 18.6% transfer fee.1
45
UD's lending activities are conducted through KUPEDES loans.
Loans are available at interest rates considerably lower than those charged
by informal moneylenders for all "income-generating activities."' 146  Loans
require collateral, though household removables may be enough to satisfy
the requirement. 47  The loan application process takes approximately one
week for a new customer; the loan turnaround is shorter for repeat
borrowers.44 Loan officers maintain close contact with their clients, visiting
them as often as once or twice each week. 49  Through these visits, loan
officers screen clients based on the information they gather about a client. 5 '
Through interest rebates, access to future loans, and staff incentives,
the BRI-UD maintain a strict repayment culture among its clientele. 5' At
the end of 1996, there was close to $1.7 billion of credit outstanding to
142 McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 2.1. Each branch office of the BRI (located in kecamatan
capital towns) has a UD business manager who visits each UD regularly to monitor its operations, cash
balances, and financial controls. Boomgard & Angel, supra note 130, at 210.
14' Boomgard & Angell, supra note 130, at 211. Newly established UD receive an initial equity
contribution of about $9000. Id.
'44 Id. at 212.
'41 Id. The branch offices u e UD deposits as a source of liquidity for other lending activities. Id.
' Charitonenko et al., supra note 110; Robinson, supra note 46, at 40.
'41 McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 2.1; see also Robinson, supra note 46, at 31; but see
Charitonenko et al., supra note 110 ("[UD] were legally required to take collateral but were flexible in
doing so... Collateral is strongly desired but not mandatory.")
141 Charitonenko et al., supra note 110.
149 Id.
15o Id.
"' The interest rate on KUPEDES loans is at or near 32%. Generally, the loans mature over one year
and payments are made on a monthly basis. Id. When loan payments have been made in full and on time
each month, up to twelve percent of the interest payments may be returned to a borrower at the end of the
loan period. This is referred to as the "Prompt Payment Incentive." LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 138.
Clients perceive the incentive as a positive incentive rather than a potential penalty. Robinson, supra note
46, at 32. The availability of larger loans in the future is also used as an incentive to induce timely
repayment. Staff bonuses are linked to the performance of the loan portfolio, and thus, they create
incentives for staff to screen and monitor clients more carefully. Ultimately, if the client does not repay,
penalties may be assessed, though foreclosure is unlikely because the small size of the loans and the
costliness of foreclosure procedures make foreclosure cost-prohibitive. Charitonenko et al., supra note
110.
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approximately 2.5 million borrowers.' The long-term loss ratio for the
islands of Java and Bali averaged 2.2%, while the ratio on other islands
ranged from 1.9% to 4.8%. 153 The UD profits before tax in 1996 were $177
million.'54 The UD's financial success has been so significant that UD
profits have been used to subsidize the BRI's other clients.1
55
The minimum loan size in 1996 was $10.50, but few loans below $50
have been made since 1987.56 As of January 1995, only 14.6% of the
KUPEDES credits consisted of loans below $215.' The maximum loan
size has grown from $1000, in 1984, to $10,500, in 1996.158 The average
loan size in 1996 was $1007, though 70% of the loans were below that
average. 5 9
In addition to a successful microcredit program, the UD have
mobilized savings, that have been vital to the program's financial success.
Prior to the transformation of the UD into microfinance intermediaries in
1984, each UD had mobilized about $8,000 in savings."6 By December
1996, the average savings per UD had risen to $800,000.16l The average
savings balance per client was $163, or 16% of the average annual income
for Indonesians. 6 2  As of December 31, 1996, the total amount of UD
deposits was $3 billion.
The UD's remarkable success in mobilizing savings can be attributed
to the BRI's extensive research and implementation of products suitable for
varying client needs. In addition to the TABANAS savings product, which
had been offered since 1976, the BRI introduced three new products to serve
the various savings needs of clients. 6 3  While TABANAS offered 15%
annual interest on savings, it limited withdrawals to two per month. Savers
did not like the limited liquidity of the product. In response to market
surveys, the BRI introduced a new unlimited withdrawals savings product,
1 Charitonenko et al., supra note 110.
"s The long-term loss ratio is the total amount overdue one day or more at the end of the period
(Dec. 1996), including amounts written off, divided by the total amount which has fallen due between Feb.
1984 and Dec. 1996. Id.
154 Id.
... LEDGERWOOD, supra note 3, at 143. In essence, poorer clients of the BRI-UD program have
subsidized BRI's wealthier clients at lower interest rates. Id. These wealthier clients, in turn, defaulted on
their loans when the Asian Financial Crisis hit, prompting a massive effort to recapitalize BRI. See infra
Part V.B.6.
136 Charitonenko et al:, supra note 110.
' MeGuire et al., supra note 128, § 2.1.
"' Charitonenko et al., supra note I 10
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 2.1.
163 Robinson, supra note 29, at 41, 43.
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SIMPEDES.' 64  SIMPEDES paid less interest than TABANAS, 6 but its
liquidity made the product attractive. 166  To augment the SIMPEDES
product, the BRI instituted the SIMASKOT product, an urban version of
SIMPEDES for use in unit banks established in cities.1 67  In addition to
TABANAS, SIMPEDES, and SIMASKOT, the BR introduced the Deposito
Berjangka ("DEPOSITO") in 1986 for timed deposits. 168
The success of the UD program has translated into real benefits for the
poorer population in Indonesia. Credit needs that were never sufficiently
addressed through subsidized credit programs have been served through a
well-managed KUPEDES product. Because the UD programs offer credit at
higher-than-market interest rates, poorer borrowers do not have to worry
about wealthier clients capturing credit to their exclusion. 69  Savings
products now exist that suit the individual needs and preferences of poorer
clients. BRI studies indicate that very few borrowers who have borrowed
from UD three or more times remain below the poverty line. 7 ° UD
borrowers enjoyed 25% growth in real profits, 21% growth in household
income, and 18% growth in employment per enterprise.' 7'
B. Locally-Based Microfinance Programs72
The smaller, government sponsored microfinance programs help fill
gaps in the BRI-UD's service network. The programs discussed below are
sponsored by the provincial or village governments. In comparison to the
BRI-UD program, these programs have a smaller loan portfolio, smaller loan
"4 Id. at 41.
165 At the end of 1996, SIMPEDES paid 0% monthly compounded interest on average monthly
balances below Rp25,000 (about $1 1), 0.75% on balances from Rp25,000 to Rp200,000 (about $11 - $85),
and 1.125% on amounts above Rp200,000. Charitonenko et al., supra note 110.
" See Robinson, supra note 29, at 43. Furthermore, the BRI instituted a non-cash prize bi-annual
lottery at the district level for SIMPEDES clients. Charitonenko et al., supra note 110.
' Robinson, supra note 29, at 43. SIMASKOT carries a separate interest rate schedule than
SIMPEDES and its lottery prize is in cash, but the product is essentially the same as SIMPEDES.
Charitonenko et al., supra note 110.
"' The deposits have maturity periods of one, three, six, twelve or twenty-four months. The interest
paid on Deposito Berjangka ("DEPOSITO") is higher than the other products (18-21%), and the product
appeals to clients who often save for particular future goals, such as retirement, pilgrimage, or building
construction. Robinson, supra note 29, at 43-44.
"6 See supra Part II.C. . for a discussion regarding wealthier clients who capture cheap credit to the
exclusion of poorer clients.
' Charitonenko et al., supra note 110.
171 Id.
' The MFIs presented in this section do not present a complete inventory or description of all
locally-based MFIs. Information about the MFIs discussed in this section is based on Riedinger, supra
note 73, and Ravicz, supra note 8.
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amounts, higher interest rates, and not as many depositors. Their operating
costs are considerably higher than the UD, since many of the organizations
do not have the structural backing of a large institution like the BRI.
Furthermore, costs are higher since many of these MFIs attempt to reach
clients located in the outermost regions of the country.
1. Central Java's BKK Program
The BKK Program in Central Java, in operation since 1972, provides
credit and savings services to the population of Java.' 73  In 1972, the
governor of Central Java instituted the BKK program to provide fast, cheap,
and productive credit to the rural poor.' 74 In response to the failure of the
BIMAS program to reach the poor, the BKK was instituted with different
policies, including elimination of subsidized credit and extension of credit
for non-agricultural purposes. 7 5  By shifting away from cheap credit,
reducing administrative costs through simplified procedures, charging
interest rates high enough to cover costs'76 and prevent capital erosion, and
maintaining high repayment rates, the BKK has developed into a financially
viable MFI.1
77
The use of character references has been a particularly effective
method of securing loans and facilitating high repayment. Because many
Central Javanese villages are close-knit and hierarchical, borrowers are
reluctant to default on their loans and risk damaging their reputations with
village leaders and other villagers. 78 Of the cumulative amount lent before
December 1989, only 2.1% has not been repaid. 79 In addition to relying on
character to maintain high repayment rates, the BKK also uses the
," See generally Riedinger, supra note 73, at 306.
17 Id. at 303.
'" Id. at 303-04.
176 Borrowers paid monthly interest rates ranging from 5.3% to 6.9% depending on the repayment
term. The rates were high enough to deter wealthier clients who would have otherwise sought cheap
credit. Loans also have a mandatory savings component requiring borrowers to deposit 6.5% to 20% of
the loan amount in a savings account. Id. at 304. Despite the fact that the BKK charged higher than
market interest rates and required mandatory savings deposits, the program has grown every year since its
inception. The success of the program, despite high interest rates and savings requirements, supports
findings that microentrepreneur borrowers are less concerned with formal interest rates than with credit
availability and convenience. Id. at 305.
' Id. at 309.
1 Id. at 306.
'79 Id. As of 1992, the BKK had made about 500,000 loans totaling close to Rp49 billion (about $24
million). Id. at 305, tbl.l. The average loan size was Rpl21,000 ($58.50). Id. at 305-06. A majority of
BKK's borrowers (55%) are women and more than half have not completed primary education. Id. at 306.
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availability of future loans for higher amounts as an incentive for timely
repayment.5 0
Local BKK branches have the flexibility of operating as a local grass-
roots organization, while maintaining the benefits of oversight by a large
financial institution. Though each BKK branch is financially autonomous,
each branch is supervised by the Bank Pembangunan Daerah ("BPD") or
Provincial Development Bank. 81  With support from the government, the
BKK program has been able to become a financially viable MFI by
instituting simplified procedures, charging high enough interest rates,
obtaining prudent supervision, and creating a strong repayment culture.'82
The BKK has brought valuable financial services to the poor in Central
Java. 183
2. South Kalimantan 's BKK Program
The South Kalimantan provincial government has owned and operated
a BKK program ("SK-BKK") since 1985. It is modeled on Central Java's
BKK program but functions independently of it.' 8 Like the BKK in Central
Java, the SK-BKK has successfully used character references to extend a
large number of loans and maintain a healthy repayment rate. 5  The SK-
s Id. Additionally, the BKK offers staff performance incentives (in the form of bonuses) to expand
the clientele, retain existing clientele, and to maintain high repayment rates. Id. at 304.
"I Id. at 302. Within the scope of administrative guidelines issued by the Bank Pembangunan
Daerah ("BPD"), BKK branches have the freedom to operate as the needs of its clientele dictate. The BPD
supervises the individual units and also provides technical assistance (particularly in designing and
implementing a set of simple, standardized, operating procedures). Id.
8' KHANDKER. supra note 12, at 15 n.3.
113 A survey of the BKK program conducted in 1982 by the U.S. Agency for International
Development indicated that borrowers, through an average loan of Rp59,000 ($88 in 1982), increased the
amount of time they devoted to their microenterprises and generated 0.3 new full-time jobs and 0.4 new
part-time jobs. This data indicates that for every $220 loaned out, one new full-time job is created.
Riedinger, supra note 73, at 306. The average annual salary of a full-time laborer in rural Java in 1982
was roughly equal to $220. This means that for a $220 loan, one full-time job could be created at a cost no
greater than the salary associated with the job. Id. If a $220 loan can create one job, the cost is low
enough such that there exists great potential for high replicability. In addition to employment gains, 90%
of borrowers surveyed reported cost-savings, which they used to expand their businesses, improve their
housing, or to increase their personal consumption. Id.
'u Ravicz, supra note 8, at 32.
s In addition to character references, South Kalimantan BKK ("SK-BKK") requires that a borrower
have a business or employment to be considered for a loan. Furthermore, if the loan is for more than
Rp200,000 ($86), the borrower must provide a vehicle or land as collateral and the head of the subdistrict
must approve the loan. If a borrower is married, his or her spouse will be required to sign the promissory
note. Id. at 33, 35. In 1995, SK-BKK units made 34,518 loans totaling Rp7.8 billion ($3.4 million).
Loans ranged from $21 to $428 in size. Id. at 33, 38. Borrowers generally paid 2.5% interest per month
and made mandatory savings deposits with each loan. Of the loans made in 1995, the SK-BKK's arrears
rate was 5.9% of outstanding loans and the default rate was 3.5%. "Arrears rate" is the amount of overdue
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BKK maintains high repayment rates by using the availability of future loans
as a repayment incentive and by sending loan officers to visit a borrower's
village if the payment is overdue by several days.' 86 Organizationally, the
SK-BKK functions similarly to the BKK in Central Java.'87 Like the BKK
in Central Java, the SK-BKK branches have the benefit of prudential
supervision by a large banking institution, yet have the leeway to tailor their
services to client needs.
Though the interest rate'88 of SK-BKK loans may be higher than loans
offered through BRI-UD, SK-BKK better targets a poorer clientele.
SK-BKK has lower average loan amounts and lower maximum loan
amounts than BRI-UD. The majority of borrowers are petty traders 189 who
generally have smaller loan requirements.9 Though BRI-UD's loans are
available at a cheaper rate, poorer clients seeking smaller loans may have to
bear higher interest rates to cover the costs of outreach for service in
outlying regions and the lack of a large institutional infrastructure.
3. The BKD Program
BKD is a system of village-owned and operated non-bank financial
institutions operating in East, West, and Central Java and Yogyakarta
Provinces. 9 ' BKD units issue credit and also accept voluntary savings. Its
loan funds come from an initial capital grant from the provincial
governments, earnings from activities, and mandatory and voluntary
savings."' Though BKD units do not require an ongoing subsidy, some of
loan principal (or principal plus interest) divided by the loan portfolio outstanding. LEDGERWOOD, supra
note 3, at 265. Loans that are overdue by ninety days or more are considered to be in default. Ravicz,
supra note 8, at 35.
6 Ravicz, supra note 8, at 35.
' The 110 SK-BKK branches are supervised by the BPD. Though the BPD is supposed to make
official policy decision regarding branch activities, i.e., the types of savings and loan products to be
offered, individual branch managers often end up making these decisions. Id. at 32-33.
.88 Though the program's interest rates are high enough to cover the cost of operations, SK-BKK
receives many in-kind subsidies, such as free building space, furniture, motorcycles, staff training,
guidance, and supervision. Thus, it is difficult to determine the financial sustainability of the program. Id.
at 32.
189 Id. at 39.
g The varying terms of SK-BKK loans (ten weeks to eighteen months) as opposed to the twelve-
month term of a Bank Rakyat Indonesia Unit Desa ("BRI-UD") loan, also indicate that SK-BKK may be a
purer MFI, strictly adhering to the microfinance philosophy of short-term, small-amount loans.
'9' Id. at 76. Badan Kredit Desa ("BKD") were established by Dutch Ordinance in 1898, and have
existed in their present form since 1952. As of 1996, there were 4,806 active BKD in Indonesia. Id.
192 Id. Some BKD units may borrow funds from other BKD, the local government, or the BRI. Id.
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the units have slowly decapitalized; in 1992, the BRI recapitalized 1,000
units."'
The BKD's lending experience also provides support for the
effectiveness of character references as a collateral substitute. Like the BKK
programs in Central Java and South Kalimantan, the BKD programs rely on
character references to establish a borrower's creditworthiness. 94 Part-time
staff members hired from within the village run the day-to-day operations
out of the village leader's home or a public building.' 9 In 1996, the BKD
made 1.8 million loans totaling close to $131 million while maintaining a
low default rate of 5%. 196 BKD clients paid interest rates higher than rates
charged by the BRI-UD or the BKK programs; interest rates equaled 7.2%
per month. 197  Even with the higher-than-market interest rates, the BKD
attracted a large number of borrowers, supporting the proposition that access
to loans and convenience are more important to borrowers than interest
rates.' 9  Like the BKK programs, the BKD are able to operate as
independent units while maintaining the benefits of oversight by a larger,
formal financial institution.' 99
C. NGO Involvement in Microfinance Activities
While the Indonesian government has broadly supported microfinance
activities administered by the BRI and BPDs, it has not provided equal
support for NGO involvement in microfinance °° One reason for this is
Indonesia's wide-reaching Department of Home Affairs, which administers
health, family planning, family welfare, and agricultural agencies throughout
-9 Id. at 80.
'9' See Riedinger, supra note 73; Ravicz, supra note 8, at 35.
" Ravicz, supra note 8, at 76, 80. Staff members are hired from within the village. Id. at 77.
Inferring from the structure of BKD units (operations out of the houses of village leaders; administration
by fellow village members), social pressure must operate to induce borrower repayment. Id.
' Id. at 19, 77. The average loan amount was $71 (or 7% of the GDP per capita), with loans
ranging from a minimum of$11 to a maximum of $257. Id.
"' Id. at 77. BKD loans have a mandatory savings component, whereby, for a loan with a twelve-
week term payable in equal weekly installments, the first payment represents the interest on the loan, the
second payment represents a forced savings payment, and the remaining payments account for the loan
principle. Id.
'9 See discussion supra Part II.C. I.c.
'99 See discussion supra Parts III.B.I. and III.B.2. Each BKD unit is supervised by a BRI staff
member, who visits the unit at least once a month to review the unit's bookkeeping, cash handling, and
loan portfolio quality. Ravicz, supra note 8, at 76-77. This structure permits local village members, with
their superior information, to make decisions about loan allocation, yet ensures that the financial operations
of the unit are sound.
" McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 1.4.
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the provinces. 201  The various agencies often subsume microfinance into
their offered services.20 2 Furthermore, government officials are reluctant to
support NGO activities (in microfinance and social services) because of the
fear that such support will shift political energy and influence away from the
state's own agencies.0 3
The government's failure to help develop NGO microfinance
initiatives can also be explained by its steadfast support for the village
cooperative (Koperasi Unit Desa or "KUD") system. Since 1967, the
government has promoted KUDs as a vehicle for government social
programs, including microfinance programs.2' Administered by the
Department of Cooperatives, there are currently 34,000 officially-supported
KUDs. 20 5  The KUDs have been beneficiaries of a large amount of
government resources; the Central Bank's data indicates that as much as
12.3% of all credit it extended as of March 1994 went to KUDs for
lending.20 6
One Indonesian NGO providing microfinance services is Bina
Swadaya.20 7 Bina Swadaya is a multi-faceted NGO that provides a range of
services, including microfinance services.0 8 With a staff of 700, this NGO
delivers direct financial services through the five rural banks it owns.20 9
Bina Swadaya is also a participant in a larger government initiative, Program
201 Id.
202 Id. For example, the family planning board offers a subsidized, group-based lending program for
poor families. Ravicz, supra note 8, at 23.
203 McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 1.4.
254 Id. § 1.3. The Koperasi Unit Desa ("KUD") play an important part in the Indonesian national
ideology of Pancasila. Id. Pancasila encompasses the five founding principles of the Republic of
Indonesia: Belief in the One Supreme God; just and civilized humanity; democracy led by the deliberations
among representatives; and social justice for the whole people of Indonesia. The Virtual Library on
Microcredit, Bina Swadaya, (visited Oct. 6, 2000) < http://www.soc.titech.ac.jp/icm>.
205 McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 1.3.
206 The suitability of KUDs as MFIs is questionable. The KUD are reputed to be "largely inefficient,
corrupt, and smothered by central government bureaucracy" and known for their poor financial practices
(including failure to adhere to prudent banking standards). Id.; see also Ravicz, supra note 8, at 27.
207 McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 1.4. Bina Swadaya is short for Badan Pengembangan Swadaya
Masyarakat or Community Self-Reliance Development Agency. The Virtual Library on Microcredit,
supra note 204.
200 Bina Swadaya's activities include: education and training; promotion of women in development;
microfinance development; micro enterprise development, social forestry development; sustainable
agriculture development; integrated irrigation development; health and environment development;
agribusiness development; magazine publication; book publication; printing house; alternative tourism;
policy dialogue; and poverty alleviation. The Virtual Library on Microcredit, supra note 204.
209 McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 1.4. Under the 1992 Banking Act, banks were divided into two
types: Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (people's credit banks, frequently referred to as rural banks) and
commercial banks. Rural banks are small-scale savings banks that accept time and savings deposits and
extend credit. They are limited in terms of location, function and portfolio composition and, furthermore,
do not offer check or foreign exchange facilities or participate in the payment systems. Id. § 4.1.
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Hubungan Bank dan KSM ("PHBK"), a microfinance program sponsored by
the Bank of Indonesia and the German government's Agency for Technical
Cooperation.21 ° The PHBK program pairs banks (mainly rural banks and
BPDs) with NGOs that loan funds to credit groups, which then disburse
funds to group members.2 1' The NGOs are free to establish the terms under
which they will make loans.2" 2 While free to establish loan terms as their
needs see fit, the PHBK encourages NGOs to require a 20% mandatory
savings deposit in lieu of collateral.213 NGOs operating under the program
offered loans with monthly interest rates ranging from 3.2% to 15.3%.214
The PHBK program does not reliably track annual defaults, thus, accurate
data is not available on PHBK loan performance.2 15
Current regulations governing NGO activities hamper their ability to
become financially self-sustaining organizations. Current laws permit
NGOs to pursue almost any economic activity, so long as those activities
further social objectives.2 6  Thus, NGOs can conduct microcredit lending
activities.2 " However, NGOs are prohibited from mobilizing savings from
its members. 2 8  This limitation on savings mobilization eliminates a key
219
source of funding for NGO MFI activities.
A 1992 banking law also affects the ability of NGOs to become
effective MFIs. In 1992, the government passed a regulation requiring small
financial institutions that accept deposits to convert into rural banks or
cooperatives. 220  Becoming a rural bank has been difficult for many
210 Ravicz, supra note 8, at vii.
21 Id. at 52.
2. Id. at 9.
2. Idat 10.
214 Most loans do not exceed $4004500, with most loans averaging about $110, or 13% of the GDP
per capita. Id. at 10, 19.
21 Id. at 14. The program managers of Program Hubungan Bank dan KSM ("PHBK") estimate that
the cumulative default rate since the program's inception is 2-3%. Id.
216 McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 3.1.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 For a discussion of the importance of savings mobilization as a source of funding, see supra Part
II.C. I.d.
220 Ravicz, supra note 8, at 4. The Law states, "Any parties conducting business such as collecting
funds from the public in the form of deposits comprising demand deposits, time deposits, certificates of
deposit, savings, and/or other equivalent forms of deposits, shall be required to obtain an operating license
as a Commercial Bank or a Rural Bank from the Minister, except the concerned business of mobilizing
funds from the public as stipulated in a separate Act." Act of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 7 of 1992, art.
16(1) [hereinafter Law No. 7/1992], reprinted in BINHADI, FINANCIAL SECTOR DEREGULATION BANKING
DEVELOPMENT AND MONETARY POLICY 425 (1995). The Act further provided that non-bank financial
institutions had one year from the date of the Act to transform themselves into a licensed rural or
commercial bank. Id. art. 57.
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institutions because of the high minimum capital requirement of $25,000.221
Furthermore, becoming a cooperative is not preferred because cooperatives
are governed by the KUD, 2  which has a poor record of managing financial
institutions. 223  The practical effect of this regulation has been that those
financial institutions unable to meet the capital requirement of becoming
rural banks, including NGO MFIs, have been forced to develop in sub-
optimal ways.224 Inability to accept deposits, in turn, has prevented MFIs
from becoming financially viable.
IV. MORE MICROFINANCE FOR INDONESIA
With the onset of the 1997 Financial Crisis, poverty levels in
Indonesia have skyrocketed, and the need for microfinance services has
become more acute. The banking system is in ruins; many of Indonesia's
state and commercial banks are in a state of insolvency.2 25 The banks'
insolvency has meant that credit is not readily available for all of Indonesia,
rich and poor alike. 26  As a significant part of the population has been
pushed into poverty, Indonesia will have to institute poverty reduction
mechanisms to bring the country back to economic health. In addition to the
various subsidies for food and health needed to address immediate concerns,
Indonesia needs broad-based reforms to achieve high quality growth.
Microfinance, with its proven success in fighting poverty,227 should be a part
of the country's broad-based economic reforms. Unless the government
aggressively allocates additional funds for microfinance programs, poor
clients will be left without financial services and without the means to work
their way out of poverty.
22, Law No. 7/1992, supra note 220.
222 KUD is the organization charged with organizing cooperative activities in Indonesia. The KUD is
run by BAPPENAS, the national development coordination authority. RAVICZ, supra note 8, at 4.
223 Id. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the KUD system, see infra Part IV.B.6.
224 Id. For example, the SK-BKK has discontinued mobilizing deposits to comply with this
regulation. The Law provided that the SK-BKK, as well as the BKD and SK-BKK were to become
licensed rural banks only upon meeting each of the requirements stipulated in the Act. Law No.7/1992, art.
58. Parties who accept deposits without a license to operate as a rural bank may be subject to
imprisonment for up to 15 years and a maximum fine of up to $5 million. Law No.7/1992, art. 46(1).
225 After prolonged discussions with the IMF, the Indonesian government determined that it would
have to recapitalize, restructure, or shut down fifty-nine banks, which held 66% of all assets in the banking
sector. Charles Enoch, Int'l Monetary Fund, Interventions in Banks During Banking Crises: The
Experiences of Indonesia 4 (IMF Pol'y Discussion Paper No. PDP/00/2, Mar. 2000) available in IMF
website (visited Oct. 6, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/pdp/2000/pdpO2.pdf>.
226 Dan Murphy, Corporate Treasury: Indonesia: Play Now, Pay Later, FAR E. ECON. REv., Focus
40 (May 27, 1999), available in 1999 WL-FEER 8675092.
" See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
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Indonesia should turn to its government-sponsored system of
successful, self-sustaining microfinance programs to address the financial
service needs of the poor (and newly poor). The BRI-UD, BKK, and BKD
programs all provide models for additional government-sponsored MFIs.
These new state-run MFIs should be located in areas with high poverty
levels and limited access to financial institutions. They should institute
similar operating principles that have been developed by the village-level
MFIs. To fulfill its obligations to the IMF under the proposed economic
bailout, the government should channel a portion of the $47 billion aid
package to new state-sponsored MFIs.228 In addition to an increased number
of state-run MFIs,. the government should direct funds to the development of
NGO MFIs. Like the state-run MFIs, NGO MFIs should also adhere to the
core principles established by the programs mentioned above. By expanding
the number of MFs serving the poor, Indonesia will facilitate pro-poor
growth strategies that will help stabilize the economy.
A. Indonesia's Financial Crisis
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis229 shattered much of the economic
success that Indonesia had experienced over the past thirty years. Since
Soeharto came to power in 1996, the country saw real annual growth of
approximately 7%, and average annual inflation under 10%.230 Its currency
exchange rate stayed relatively stable against the dollar, and the economy
grew to be ASEAN's 23" ' largest in terms of total (although not per capita)
GDP. Following the crisis, however, the economy shrank by 14% in 1998,
while inflation ran at about 70%.232 The annual per capita income measured
in dollars on a nominal exchange rate fell from $1200 to $400, jettisoning
many into poverty and unemployment.233 Of the 220 million people in
Indonesia, several estimates project that the percentage of people living
221 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
229 Zakaria Haji Ahmad & Baladas Ghoshal, The Political Future of ASEAN After the Asian Crisis,
75 WORLD AFF. 759, 764-65 (1999). The crisis began in July 1997, when currency traders attacked the
Thai currency, followed by the Malaysian, Philippine, South Korean, and Indonesian currencies. The
over-supply of short-term foreign credit and the countries' insistence on keeping exchange rates tied to the
U.S. dollar led to a wide variation between the actual value of the currencies and their pegged rates. When
the governments were forced to release their currencies, the plunge in value was dramatic. Id.
23 Gerry Van Klinken, From Go-Go to Yo-Yo, 54 INSIDE INDONESIA (Apr.-June 1998) (visited Oct.
8, 2000) <http://www.insideindonesia.org>.
23 The Association of South East Asian Nations ("ASEAN") includes Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Home Page (visited Oct. 6, 2000) <http://www.aseansec.org>.
232 Ahmad & Ghoshal, supra note 229, at 766.
233 Id.
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below the poverty line has jumped from 11.3% in 1996 to as high as 48% as
of 1998.234 This means that the number of people living in poverty increased
from 22.5 million to about 100 million.2 35 Unemployment also has risen to
around eighteen million.236 In light of such numbers, any economic plan to
rebuild Indonesia's economy will have to include an aggressive poverty
alleviation strategy.
The IMF is administering a $43 billion economic rescue package to
draw Indonesia out of financial ruin.237  A portion of the funds will go
towards developing social safety net programs, and the Indonesian
government has pledged to earmark some of these funds for microcredit
programs to assist small businesses.238 Since 83% of agricultural households
received no formal credit and 93% of the capital of households with business
activities came from their own funds and "other sources" in 1991,239 it is
likely that small businesses in existence today are in dire need of access to
credit.
MFIs are likely to be in high demand, as more people have joined the
informal sector as a result of the Financial Crisis.24 °  Demand for
microfinance services will be ever increasing, especially since the failure of
Indonesia's state and commercial banks has put an increasing strain on
available credit. Despite the credit .crunch, efforts should be made to ensure
that microentrepreneurs have access to credit. Access to credit will increase
24 Booth, supra note 1, at 363.
Lower estimates put the number living in poverty at thirty million to seventy-nine million. Id.
Given that many people are hovering close to the poverty line, the 100 million figure may be more
realistic. Id.
236 Provinces Told to be Active in Fighting Poverty, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 18, 1999, available in
LEXIS, World News Database.
" Wayne Arnold, Foreign Aid Donors Approve $4.7 Billion More for Indonesia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
3, 2000, at C4.
23 Letter of Intent of the Government of Indonesia-Addressed to Michael Camdessus, Managing
Director of the IMF (Nov. 13, 1998), available in IMF website (visited Oct. 6, 2000)
<http://www.imf.org>. The IMF has recognized that economic reforms need to be broad-based and deep
to achieve high-quality growth. It recognizes the importance of having adequate social safety nets in place
to cushion the effects of economic reform, good-quality government spending (including allocations for
health and education), and good "governance" (no tolerance for corruption; openness in policymaking).
David D. Driscoll, International Monetary Fund, What is the International Monetary Fund? (last modified
Sept. 1998) < http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm>.
239 The Virtual Library on Microcredit, Microfinance Country Information: Indonesia (visited Oct. 6,
2000) < http://www.gdrc.org/icm/country/asia-indonesia.html>.
24 The World Bank, Indonesia-Macroeconomic Update 13 (Mar. 20, 2000), available in World
Bank Website (visited Oct. 6, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org>. The percentage of workers in the
informal sector rose from 62.8% in 1997 to 65.4% in 1998. Id.
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personal incomes and create employment.241 It will be a means to shift
people out of poverty and back into the formal sector.242
B. The Need for Increased Government-sponsored MFIs
Today, Indonesia's experience with state-run microfinance
intermediation has heightened significance as the country pulls itself out of a
severe economic depression. Indonesia should apply the knowledge and
experience gained through the BRI-UD, BKK, and BKD programs when
establishing new MFIs. These programs share several of the same policies
and practices, namely concerning collateral, interest rates, savings
mobilization, repayment incentives, and supervision, that have accounted for
much of the programs' success throughout the areas they serve.
1. Collateral Substitutes
Newly formed state-sponsored MFIs should incorporate collateral
substitutes in their lending model. The BRI-UD, BKK and BKD programs
have all devised means to extend credit without requiring physical collateral.
Most of these programs rely on character references to determine the
creditworthiness of a borrower.2 43  As the high repayment rates of the
programs indicate, this method is an effective way to screen for loan
eligibility. By lending based on character references, the programs are able
to reach clients who are otherwise ineligible for assistance from formal
financial institutions.2" This policy facilitates delivering financial services
to the truly poor. With the increased number of poor in Indonesia, new MFI
programs should be focused on outreach to all of the poor and should adopt
practices, like collateral substitutes, which will facilitate such outreach.
Though the use of character references has effectively secured loans
made by the BRI-UD, BKK, and, BKD programs, new MFIs should
understand that the effectiveness of character references depends on the
importance of maintaining one's character within his or her community.245
The programs surveyed operate in communities that are traditional and
243 See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
242 As opposed to the informal sector, formal sector employment includes employment that is part of
the regulated economy.
14' All of the programs substitute character references for collateral, except for the SK-BKK, which
requires a borrower to put up an automobile or land to secure loans over Rp200,000.
244 For a discussion of lending based on character references, see supra Part II.C. I.b.
245 For example, for the BKK in Central Java, clients' interests in maintaining their character within a
small tight-knit community induce them to repay loans on time. Riedinger, supra note 73, at 306.
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tightly knit. Social pressure has an impact on individual behavior in such
communities.246 Absent such community conditions, relying on character
references may not be sufficient security for a microcredit loan.247
2. Interest Rates High Enough to Cover the Cost of Services
The new MFIs should charge interest rates high enough to cover their
cost of services to become financially self-sustaining organizations.2 48  As
long-term viability and financial self-sustainability are integral for a MFI's
success, MFIs must take steps to eliminate their dependence on donor
subsidies. 249 As the BRI-UD, BKK, and BKD programs indicate, higher-
than-market interest rates will not deter poor clients from borrowing
funds.25° Even if the interest rate that a MFI charges to effect full cost-
recovery is considerably higher-than-market, the rate will likely be
substantially lower than the astronomical rates charged by moneylenders.25'
Furthermore, charging a relatively high interest rate will eliminate the
incentive for wealthier clients to pursue cheap credit. 2  The available funds,
in essence, will be earmarked specifically for poor clients.
3. Savings Mobilization
To emulate the success of a MFI like BRI-UD, new MFIs must
aggressively mobilize savings from their clientele.253 As the data from BRI-
UD indicates, if enough client savings are mobilized, donor subsidies can be
eliminated.5 4  In addition to boosting the financial stability of the MFI,
mobilized savings can also benefit the client. Over time, clients can self-
fund their business activities with his or her accumulated deposits.
Furthermore, deposit accounts can also provide a buffer to poor clients when
they hit hard times and are strapped for cash. A MFI should pay careful
246 See discussion supra Part III.B. 1.
247 The use of character references in urban units of the Central Java BKK proved to be ineffective.
Clients in these areas lacked social cohesion and the unit management was often corrupt; village heads
would often approve loans to transients for a fee. Riedinger, supra note 73, at 307.
24 For a discussion of the relevance of sufficient interest rates, see discussion supra Part I.C. I.c.
249 See KHANDKER, supra note 12, at 84; Riedinger, supra note 73, at 307.
... See Riedinger, supra note 73, at 305-06; Charitonenko et al, supra note 110; Ravicz, supra note 8,
at 29.
231 KHANDKER, supra note 12, at 2.
.2 YARON ET AL, supra note 24, at 26.
233 For a discussion on the importance of savings mobilization, see discussion supra Part I.C. I.d.
234 See discussion supra Part lII.A.
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attention to establishing trust with the depositor since trust is essential to the
promise of repayment.255
4. Incentives for Repayment
Any new MFI must build incentives for repayment into their lending
model. Where a MFI cannot fall back on collateral to cover the costs of
default, it is essential to maintain incentives that will facilitate a high
repayment. The BRI-UD and BKK programs both provided access to larger
loans in the future as an incentive for timely repayment.5 6 The BRI-UD
further incorporated an interest rebate incentive, paying back a portion of the
interest paid if all payments were made on time.257 This "carrot" method has
proven to be successful and proves that availability of loans is of great
importance to borrowers. New MFIs need to adopt similar incentives in
order to keep the number of loan defaults at a minimum and prevent
decapitalization of its lending funds.
MFIs should also adopt staff incentives to maintain high repayment
levels. All of the state-run programs mentioned above have distributed
bonuses based on staff members' ability to maintain healthy loan portfolios
and collect timely payments. Loan performance-based incentives encourage
loan officers to be more careful in their selection of borrowers, and
furthermore, encourage the officers to remain in close contact with the
borrower. By including staff in the loan repayment scheme, the MFI "wins"
by achieving higher repayment rates, while the client "wins" by having an
open channel of communication with the loan officer.
Failure to institute staff incentives may have a detrimental effect on an
MFI's activities. For example, the BKD program has encountered problems
because there are insufficient incentives for part-time staff to maintain a
healthy loan portfolio. Though staff performance incentives are offered to
increase the number of clients and maintain high repayment rates, the BKD
have difficulty expanding their clientele base. Since most employees have
other jobs and only conduct loan transactions once a week, they usually lack
the incentive to expand the volume of their business or diversify their
clientele. This has, unfortunately, led to BKD units making loans to the
same small pool of clients.2 8 BKD units could better leverage their informal
255 See Fiebig et al., supra note 32, at 4.
256 Charitonenko et al., supra note 110; Riedinger, supra note 73, at 306; Ravicz, supra note 8, at 35.
27 LEDGERWOOD, sutpra note 3, at 245.
258 Ravicz, supra note 8, at 80. BKD programs lack the inherent drive to become larger and to reach
more clients. Id.
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position within villages by creating staff incentives to reach new clients.
This could be accomplished by, for example, hiring one full-time loan
officer who would have to rely on an increased number of clients and higher
rates of repayment to earn a larger bonus.
5. Prudential Supervision by a Government Bank
The newly-formed MFIs should be supervised by a government or
commercial bank.259 Past successful programs owe their success not only to
their grass-roots focus, but also to their supervision by formal institutions.2 60
With supervision, the MFIs are forced to adhere to formal financial reporting
requirements. Formal data, in turn, facilitates analysis of a MFI's financial
condition.261' Depending on formal financial institutions for supervision
while maintaining financial autonomy would permit new MFIs to tailor their
services to the needs of clients while ensuring that their activities are not
financially unfeasible.262 Supervision would also provide security for
depositors who entrust their money with MFIs.263
6. Control of Corrupt Officials
In forming these new MFIs, the government must ensure that funds
are not siphoned off by corrupt officials. 264 The fate of the BRI-UD
following the Asian Financial Crisis raises issues that new MFIs should
address in their formation. The BRI-UD has not survived the financial crisis
intact. Because the UD were a profit unit within the larger BRI, the UD
have suffered from the cross-subsidization of BRI's commercial lending
activities. Wealthier clients of the BRI have not maintained high repayment
259 Due to the current banking crisis, it may take time for the banks to recover and reestablish
themselves as institutions capable of overseeing an MFI's operations.
260 See supra Parts III.A, I.B.l, III.B.2. & III.B.3.
26 In surveying MFIs in East Asia, the SBP found that many MFIs do not adhere to financial
reporting standards and, thus, could not provide accurate data on their activities. Sustainable Banking with
the Poor-a World Bank Project, supra note 119.
262 Like the BKK in Central Java, MFIs could rely on banks for technical expertise while retaining
the freedom to adapt their services to clients' lending needs. See supra Part III.B.1.
263 Art. 16(l) of the 1992 Banking Law was enacted because, "the collection of funds from the public
by any party is in principle an activity that must be supervised" for the benefit of those who deposit funds.
Elucidations to the Act of the Republic of Indonesia No. 7 of 1992, art. 16, reprinted in BINHADI, supra
note 220, at 451.
264 In February 2000, the disbursement of $4.7 billion (as part of the larger aid package) was made
contingent on Indonesia's cooperation in eliminating rampant corruption. There have been reports of
widespread "leakage" (official corruption) of aid funds. Wayne Arnold, Foreign Aid Donors Approve $4.7
Billion More for Indonesia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2000, at C4.
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rates.265 Corrupt practices indicate where BRI and its UD's profits have
likely gone.266 The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency ("IBRA")267 has
begun to take over BRI and to start its restructuring. It has taken over more
than $80 million of BRI's bad debts.268 Recapitalization of the bank is
expected to cost over $400 million total.269 IBRA intends to restructure BRI
to focus on micro-scale lending. 27° After the restructuring is complete,
IBRA is planning an initial public offering for BRI.27 1 IBRA is hoping to
attract foreign investors by selling an institution focused primarily on small
and medium-scale business or farming activities. 72
The government's mass financing of KUDs highlights its
shortcomings with respect to controlling official corruption. With the
KUDs' poor reputation, one wonders whether the government is wasting
valuable resources by pumping large amounts of money into organizations
that do not effectively serve the financial needs of poor clients. 3 With the
KUDs taking up a large part of government funding, the environment is not
one conducive to the proliferation of NGO MFIs.274 The government must
eliminate corruption within the KUD or should focus its funding efforts on
programs which are not tainted by corruption.
Though no new MFI will reach the size of the BRI anytime soon, the
BRI's experience warns that improvident policies can cripple an institution.
The BRI's experience shows that unless official corruption is controlled,
vast amounts of money could be sunk into loans destined for default.
275
Furthermore, the BRI experience indicates that poor borrowers, who repay
265 Charitonenko et al., supra note 110.
26 A recent inquiry brought to light BRI's loan to the Texmaco group amounting to $754 million.
The loan was obtained through the intervention of Soeharto, in violation of a rule requiring prudent
management of the country's foreign exchange reserves. Indonesian Govt Hopes IMF Would Not Delay
Loan, XINHUA (Mar. 17, 2000), available in LEXIS, Emerging Markets Datafile.
267 Established by Presidential Decree No. 27/1998, Indonesian Bank Restructuring Authority has the
authority to conduct, control, develop, improve solvency, and restructure banks declared unsound by Bank
Indonesia (the central bank). Presidential Decree No. 27 of 1998, art. 2(b).
26 Government plans IPOfor BRI, THE JAKARTA POST, Feb. 16, 2000, available in LEXIS, World
News File.
269 id.
270 Interestingly, the article states that the shift of operations toward micro-lending signals BRI's
return to its core activities. Furthermore, the article attributes BRI's financial difficulties to "venturing into
corporate loan activities." Id.
271 Id.
272 id.
273 Presumably, since the KUD is a state-run organization, "corruption" and "inefficiency" indicate
that funds are being siphoned off by corrupt government officials and their cronies.
274 The development of the KUD system has also diverted resources away from further development
of the BKD system. The government has discontinued plans to expand the BKD system out of fear that the
BKD's microfinance activities would compete with the activities of the KUD. Ravicz, supra note 8, at 27.
275 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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their loans on time and deposit their excess savings, may bear the burden of
wealthier clients with poor repayment histories because of poor policy
decisions by management of the larger institution.276 In order to prevent
institutions from making policy decisions that disadvantage poorer clients,
MFIs should only provide microfinance services. 277 They should not engage
in commercial financing and, thereby, incur unnecessary risks for their
clientele.
C. The Need for Increased NGO Activity in Microfinance
Despite the success of state-run MFIs, the current financial crisis
highlights the need for a more dynamic microfinance environment.
Indonesia has shown that it knows how to create sustainable state-sponsored
MFIs, like the BRI-UD, BKK, and BKD. However, the success and
invigoration of state-run organizations has overshadowed and often
displaced NGOs from participating in microfinance intermediation.278 The
devastation of Indonesia's formal financial system indicates that more NGO
participation in microfinance services would lead to a healthier microfinance
environment for the country's people.
While the PHBK program is evidence of steps taken by the Indonesian
government to incorporate NGOs in the provision of microfinance services,
NGO activities through the PHBK program have very high program costs.
27 9
These high costs require a much larger government subsidy than
independent units like the BKK or BKD. As of 1995, the SK-BKK had to
charge 64% annual interest to operate without donor subsidies. 280  In
comparison, NGO lenders in the PHBK program would have had to charge
277% to operate without such aid.2 ' An NGO operating independent of the
PHBK could avoid the large overhead costs attendant to its multi-layered
credit delivery scheme. If the government channeled funds directly into
NGOs as it does into BKDs (initial capitalization), 282 NGOs could deliver
financial services without the intermediate steps that add to program costs.
276 Id.
277 By focusing efforts on microfinance, an MFI would not have to worry about its assets cross-
collateralizing large commercial loans.
27' Few NGOs are involved in microfinance in Indonesia. See supra Part III.C.
279 Ravicz, supra note 8, at 20. The program costs are high in PHBK because of the multiple
organizations involved in the lending scheme. First, the rural bank or BPD makes a loan to the NGO. The
NGO then loans to a borrowing group, and the borrowing group finally disburses funds to its members. A
simpler, more direct model would presumably cost less to administer. Id.
280 Id. at 15.
281 Id.
22 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
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Furthermore, allocating funds directly to NGOs would appear to be more
cost-efficient than channeling funds through expensive programs like the
PHBK.
1. Why an Increase in State-run MFIs is Not Enough
The absence of NGO MFIs in Indonesia is felt when complaints about
government microfinance programs are voiced. In October of 1998, the
Indonesian government announced that it had allocated $1.3 billion to fund
microcredit schemes designed to help small and medium enterprises
("SMEs") and cooperatives. Yet by December, critics and advocates of
SMEs had observed that the bureaucratic barriers, including requirements
for collateral, business licenses, tax registration numbers, and business
location permits, had made it very difficult for SMEs to qualify for the
loans.284 Banks, through which the credit was channeled, were not
disbursing funds, and the alternative (government disbursement) would
likely have led to collusion and disappearance of funds. 85 These stories,
coupled with incidents of official corruption in state banking such as the
Texmaco loan, suggest that a third party non-commercial NGO operating
locally might be better able to ascertain its clients needs and deliver the
credit needed without requiring clients to wade through layers of
bureaucracy.
Alternatively, more flexible organizations are needed to reach the
poorer clientele that the BRI-UD are simply failing to serve. The increase in
loan amounts indicates that the BRI-UD, the largest state bank with the most
extensive branch network, may not be reaching the poorest clients in need of
microfinance services.286 To the BRI-UD's credit, it has recognized that
smaller borrowers have been gradually excluded from lending activities,
and, to rectify the situation, it now offers a smaller scale KUPEDES product,
283 Observers Skeptical Over Micro Credit Schemes, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 14, 1998, available in
LEXIS, World News Database.
284 id.
285 Id.
286 A commonly used measure to assess the outreach of a microfinance program is to look at the ratio
of loan size to GDP per capita. In 1995, the average loan size to GDP per capita for loans extended by
locally-based MFIs (BKK and BKD) ranged from seven percent to ten percent. In comparison, BRI-UD
had an average loan size of 89% of per capita GDP. See Ravicz, supra note 8, at 19. BRI-UD's outreach
to the poorest segments of the population is also questionable based on the percentage of its borrowers who
are female (24%). In comparison, women account for 40 to 62% of borrowers of the locally-based MFIs.
See Ravicz, supra note 8, at 20; Boomgard & Angell, supra note 130, at 222. The collateral requirement
for loans also affects the BRI-UD's ability to reach the poorest of the poor. Nelson, supra note 37.
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which has a maximum loan amount of $215.287 Increased NGO participation
in the provision of financial services would permit the creation of an
organization designed to serve solely the very poor, for example, by
facilitating the offering of credit based on a group liability scheme rather
than on collateral requirements.
Anecdotal evidence that state-run MFIs are not adequately reaching
poorer clients who need financial services further points to the need to
develop additional NGO MFIs. In interviews conducted by the Rural
Development Institute on Java,288 rural farmers from four villages stated that
credit was not available. When asked about the availability of loans through
the BKK, respondents stated that the collateral requirement was a barrier.
Respondents also stated that though the BKD offered credit, the weekly
payments were too high, especially in light of their limited cash flow.289 The
interviews also revealed that women do not use the state-run MFIs and
suffer acutely from the lack of credit. Although state-run MFIs must adhere
to their models of lending that implicate collateral requirements and short-
term pay periods, smaller NGO MFIs could tailor their loan products
specifically to suit the needs of their clientele. NGOs would have the
advantage of serving a smaller number of clients and, thus, could offer loan
products with a different security scheme or payment plan. Furthermore,
some NGOs could further target female clients, alleviating their alienation
from more traditional, state-provided sources of credit.
Furthermore, increasing NGO activity in microfinance could help
extend microfinance services to the outermost regions in Indonesia. Though
the BRI-UD and BKK have penetrated much of the country with offices in
subdistrict capital towns, there are still many villages far out of reach from
these towns.290 Though the programs utilize traveling staff to reach those
who cannot reach the village or capital town offices,29' a smaller NGO could
dedicate its efforts to one or two outlying towns and bring services regularly,
rather than on a weekly basis like the BKD. If a NGO were solely devoted
to a smaller remote town, it also would not have to incur the regular costs of
traveling to and from a distant office. In addition, because of their proximity
to their clientele, NGOs could operate with a closer understanding of their
... McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 2.1.
... Interview with Michelle vanLeeuwen, Staff Attorney, Rural Development Institute, Seattle,
Washington (May 5, 2000).
28 Farmers stated that they needed a longer payment period. Id.
299 McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 5. The Central Java BKK's 510 unit offices reach only half of
the province's 8,500 villages. Riedinger, supra note 73, at 305.
291 Riedinger, supra note 73, at 304.
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clientele that could help in designing products and services most suitable for
them.292
The government should broaden its support for microfinance activities
by funding more NGOs to become financial intermediaries. NGO MFIs are
necessary to fill the gaps in outreach of state-run MFIs and, furthermore, are
needed as fall-back institutions when the banking system is crippled.293 Like
newly-formed, state-run MFIs, newly-instituted NGO MFIs should follow
the prudent policies and practices outlined above. Because NGOs have no
direct link with the government, supervision will have to be handled in a
different manner.
294
Ideally, an NGO could form a relationship with the BPD in the region
where it operates and have the BPD oversee its financial operations.295
While maintaining control over its daily operations, the NGOs could turn to
the BPD for occasional training and guidance on policy decisions. In return
for the supervisory services, NGOs could pay a fee for the services or agree
to deposit their excess savings with the BPDs. Alternatively, NGOs could
make arrangements with a local BRI branch. Providing supervision and
occasional training to NGOs could become a lucrative side operation for the
BPDs or BRI branches.296
NGO involvement in microfinance cannot develop healthily unless
NGOs are permitted to mobilize savings from its members. 297 The appeal of
microfinance as a poverty reduction strategy is in its ability to operate
without government or donor subsidy. As the experiences of the BRI-UD
and BKK indicate, 298 joining the elite rank of financially-viable MFIs
requires mass mobilization of savings deposits. Unless Indonesia changes
its laws regarding the ability of NGOs and other small financial institutions
to collect deposits, most of those programs will have unsure futures.299
292 Nelson, supra note 37.
29 Though the entire country was hit by the Asian financial crisis, one wonders whether currency
speculation in the Rupiah could have wreaked as much havoc on small-scale institutions as on large formal
institutions.
294 NGOs are not subject to reporting requirements or taxation. McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 3. 1.
295 The BKK programs and the BKD work symbiotically with larger organizations, the BPD and the
BRI, respectively, in their region. Riedinger, supra note 73, at 302; Ravicz, supra note 8, at 76-77.
296 Taking on this role should not be burdensome for BPDs or BRI branch offices. Both
organizations have plenty of experience with supervising MFIs in a quasi-regulatory way, i.e., the BRI-
UD, the BKK, and the BKD.
292 Savings mobilization is essential for a microfinance program to become self-sustaining.
KHANDKER, supra note 12, at 8.
s See Riedinger, supra note 73, at 305; Charitonenko et al., supra note 110.
299 Though banking laws are designed to protect depositors, they are often drafted with banks with
large portfolios in mind. The practical effect of such laws on smaller financial intermediaries, such as
NGO MFIs, is to impose standards that are impossible to meet for institutions with small or informal-type
loans. Nelson, supra note 37.
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Though mobilization of small deposit amounts appears to be tolerated,"' a
clear statutory provision permitting NGOs to mobilize deposits would
greatly boost NGO MFI activity. NGOs could operate knowing they had the
opportunity to obtain long-term viability and financial self-sustainability.
While the government's concerns about savings mobilizations by NGOs are
understandable, these fears should be allayed if a NGO is subject to
supervision by a government bank.3'
2. Creating a Regulatory Framework Supportive of NGO MFIActivities
Increasing the number of NGO MFIs in Indonesia will require
adjustments to the regulatory framework that currently governs them.
Currently, NGO MFIs are subject to two regulations that may affect the
scope of their operations. First, the 1992 banking regulation affects the
ability of some NGOs to operate as rural banks capable of accepting
deposits.30 2 Second, NGO laws prohibit NGO MFIs from accepting deposits
from members.30 3
The limitations imposed by the 1992 banking regulations coupled
with the limitation on NGO deposit mobilization create little working room
for small microfinance providers wishing to operate in Indonesia. A small
microfinance provider, without the requisite $21,400 to form a rural bank,
cannot start a credit and savings service and be confident that it will become
financially sustainable.3°4 While neither the 1992 banking regulation nor
NGO regulations limit an organization's ability to extend loans, the inability
to mobilize deposits destroys any MFI's ability to become self-sufficient.3 5
A sustainable institution is not an end in itself; it is also a key to
successful loan repayment performance. As Indonesia's state-run
organizations indicate, the small loan amounts involved in microcredit make
foreclosure cost prohibitive. The BRI-UD, BKK, and BKD are able to
induce repayment by ensuring that future loans in larger amounts will be
available if loans are repaid on time. The reason this incentive induces
" McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 3.1.
301 Since NGOs are not subject to reporting requirements, the government is presumably concerned
with protecting clients who place deposits with NGOs. Robert Christen & Richard Rosenberg, The
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest, The Rush to Regulate: Legal Frameworks for Microfinance 1,
Occasional Paper No. 4 (Apr. 2000) (visited Oct. 8, 2000) <http://www.cgap.org/assets/images/
En4occ.pdf>.
32 Ravicz, supra note 8, at 4.
3 McGuire et al., supra note 128, § 3.1.
• The law will not permit such an entity to accept deposits. See discussion supra Part III.C.
... For a discussion of the significance of savings mobilization in microfinance, see discussion supra
Part ll.C.l.d.
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repayment is because clients are confident that the institution will be around
when they need to borrow money again. Should an institution's stability be
shaky due to insufficient assets or deposits, clients are less likely to believe
that the incentive (future loans) will be available and, thus, are less likely to
repay their loans. Hence, by foreclosing the ability of small MFIs and
NGOs to shore up their assets by taking deposits, the current laws may be
endangering the healthy repayment culture maintained so far in microfinance
in Indonesia.
To bolster smaller institutions or NGO MFI involvement in Indonesia,
the laws limiting their abilities to collect deposits should be changed. If the
governmental concern is with supervision of organizations that mobilize
deposits, the banking laws prohibiting savings mobilizations from small
institutions should permit an exception to the rule for organizations retaining
the supervisory services of a government bank, like the BPD. This informal
means of regulating smaller institutions would give these institutions the
opportunity to become financially viable and save the government from
having to institute a formal regulatory framework overseeing all small
financial institutions. Alternatively, if the government is seeking to address
concerns over the low capitalization of some small institutions, it could
permit another exception to the rule by permitting institutions to obtain
guarantees for the amount that they are undercapitalized. If Indonesia is to
remain a leader in microfinance, it must find an alternative way of regulating
smaller MFIs.
The Indonesian government appears to be moving towards including
NGOs in poverty reduction strategies. In May of 1999, Indonesia passed a
law granting each province considerable autonomy in regulating matters
other than those of national concern.3" Each province will be responsible
for poverty alleviation in its area and will set its own poverty alleviation
targets and policies to deal with the problem. °7 This law is intended to
make NGOs active participants in the nationwide poverty alleviation
effort.0 8 Should this law be effectively implemented, NGOs may finally
have the much needed boost to participate in microfinance.
" The Act grants provinces authority to administer all areas of government except foreign policy,
defense and security, judiciary, and monetary and fiscal policy. Act of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 22
of 1999, art. 7(l).
'0 Provinces Told to be Active in Fighting Poverty, supra note 236.
3N Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Indonesia can take its microfinance environment to the next level of
achievement by increasing the outreach and number of its state-run MFIs
and by integrating more NGOs into the provision of microfinance services.
It should do so by eliminating legal barriers to NGO participation in both
savings and credit services provision. Whether expanding microfinance
through state-run MFIs or through NGOs, organizations should adhere to the
policies and practices that have been shown to increase the likelihood of
success for an MFI. New MFIs should be wary of political corruption,
especially if is a state-run programs.3°9 Increased NGO involvement could
reduce the clients' political risk in microfinance intermediation by offering
an opportunity to bank with a non-state-owned MFI. Furthermore, though
the state-run institutions have penetrated successfully at the village level,
further efforts to reach those in the outermost regions are needed. Smaller
NGOs with operating flexibility may be better suited for reaching these
populations.
Microfinance is a proven way to reduce poverty among the world's
poor. Indonesia has successfully shown how microfinance can be delivered
effectively and in a financially sustainable manner. Because the poverty
level has skyrocketed in Indonesia in the last two years, microfinance should
play a part in helping people work their way out of poverty. Services should
be delivered through a synergistic mix of old and newly-formed, state-
owned MFIs and microfinance-focused NGOs.
'0 As the operations of the BRI shows, a state-run program may be subject to political corruption
and, as the BKK has show, political pressure to forgive loan repayment. See Ravicz, supra note 8, at xi
("BKK and LKP faced pressures to relax their underwriting and collections efforts during the 1992
elections...").
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